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I.

INTRODUCTION

When examined from the perspective of indigents, particularly
those who are incarcerated prior to trial, the criminal justice system
is not working well. Their experience in the system demonstrates
that a gap exists between rules of law and actual practices. Proce
dural protections supposedly guaranteed by the Federal Constitution
and state statutes are not equally available because they carry a price
that indigents are not able to pay. The legitimacy and credibility of
the system is thus seriously eroded. Without the respect of those
who come into contact with it, our criminal process is severely un
dermined and rendered incapable of accomplishing its purpose. 1
This article discusses some of the apparent inequities in the sys
tem. Much of the impetus for the article was provided by several
federal court cases in Indiana which challenged various aspects of
• Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. I.D., University of No
tre Dame Law School, 1968.
•• 1.0., Valparaiso University School of Law, 1976.
••• Associate Professor of Law, Touro College School of Law. 1.0., Harvard
Law School, 1966.
1. While there are certainly exceptions, most persons will respect the system if they
feel they were treated fairly and given a reasonable opportunity to fully present a
defense.
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the system. While the article is not intended as a commentary on
these cases, the cases do provide a useful framework for analysis
and, more important, supply much information relating to actual op
eration of the system. Evidence presented in these cases reveals in
formation not otherwise gathered and disseminated. One of the
purposes of this article is to make this information known and to ask
the serious questions raised by the information. For example, it was
found that people were incarcerated for extensive periods by local
police on mere suspicion prior to the filing of criminal charges and
prolonged delays between arrest and initial court appearance were
documented in several counties. A thorough study of the money
based bail system, which keeps those without resources in jail prior
to trial, shows that it causes not only a temporary loss of liberty but
also has an adverse impact on the ultimate outcome of the criminal
proceeding. Another study demonstrated a difference in case out
come based on type of counsel, with those represented by court-ap
pointed counsel obtaining less favorable results than those with
private counsel.
In examining the system from an indigent's perspective, the to
tality of the circumstances becomes important to a full understand
ing of the impact the criminal justice system has on such individuals.
Therefore, we will review the process from the point of arrest until
the time of trial. Although this process defies neat, concise categori
zation, the discussion is divided into three areas: (1) the period be
tween arrest and initial court appearance; (2) the role and impact of
a money-based bail system; and (3) the significance of court-ap
pointed counsel. The interrelationship between these aspects of the
system will become obvious. For example, the inability to post bail
results in detention prior to the initial court appearance. Delay in
initial court appearance results in a delay in the appointment of
counsel, and the lack of counsel makes it more difficult to obtain a
bond reduction. A defect in anyone of these areas can have detri
mental effects; because these defects are almost invariably combined,
the result is intolerable.
Some of the unlawful and inequitable procedures found in the
criminal justice system are the product of long-standing tradition
and official neglect. The needed changes can be made at the local
level. Reform of practices prior to the initial court appearance re
quires no change in legislation. Rather, it is a matter of enforcing
existing law. With respect to bail and public defender practices,
state statutory law, though not mandating the changes which will be
recommended, does permit them. Despite the fact that change is
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possible within the existing statutory scheme, few communities have
implemented any meaningful reforms. This unwillingness to initiate
reform is particularly troublesome when the costs of the existing sys
tem are examined. Not only are human lives needlessly disrupted
and fundamental rights violated, but present practices result in un
necessary costs to taxpayers and are not effective in serving the
states' legitimate interests. The needed changes would not only pro
tect the constitutional and statutory rights of the indigent accused,
but would also provide the community with as much or more protec
tion at a lower cost to the taxpayers. Thus the system could be made
more equitable without additional cost to the community.
II.

DELAY BETWEEN ARREST AND INITIAL COURT

ApPEARANCE-THE EVILS OF UNSUPERVISED POLICE/
PROSECUTOR CONTROL

The period between arrest and initial court appearance can be
most devastating. Even short-term incarceration can have disastrous
consequences on the lives of arrestees. Family relationships are dis
rupted, employment is threatened, and loss of job undermines the
economic stability of families. In addition, pre-trial detention facili
ties are notorious for overcrowding, poor living conditions and treat
ment which infringe on basic human rights and dignity.2 Being
incarcerated, the accused is also under the total control of the police/
prosecutorial branch of the criminal justice system; neither of the
two "protective" branches of the system, namely, defense counsel
and the impartial court, are even aware of the arrest. Important
rights can be waived by the terrified, unknowing arrestee during this
period and harmful statements to the police are not uncommon. 3
The availability of counsel can both guard against the waiver of le
gal rights and alleviate some of the human concerns during this criti
cal period. It will be shown, however, that counsel is often not
appointed until much later. 4
A greater potential for abuse during the period between arrest
2. See, e.g., Culbertson & Decker, Jails and Lockups in Indiana: A Case ofNeglect,
49 IND. L.J. 253 (1974); Justice, Glendening & Wildey, Pilot Justice Project: A Survey of
Six Indiana County Jails, 49 IND. L.J. 260 (1974). The plaintiffs in Dommer v. Hatcher,
427 F.Supp. 1040 (N.D. Ind. 1975), rev'd in part sub nom., Dommer v. Crawford, 653
F .2d. 289 (7th Cir. 1981), discussed infra text accompanying notes 20-23, also challenged
conditions and treatment at the jail.
3. COURTS, Standard 13.1 commentary 254 (National Advisory Commission on
Criminal Justice Standards and Goals 1973).
4. See infra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
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and initial court appearance exists in cases in which the arrest is
made without a warrant and thus without any judicial sanction.
While warrantless arrests are appropriate in some circumstances,s
the police must nonetheless have probable cause6 at the time of the
arrest to believe. that the person has committed a crime. The
Supreme Court in Gerstein v. Pugh 7 held that police judgment relat
ing to probable cause must be promptly reviewed by a judicial of
ficer. s The procedures challenged there allowed persons arrested
without a warrant to be jailed pending trial without any opportunity
5. The Supreme Court has expressed a preference for the use of arrest warrants
when feasible, however, "it has never invalidated an arrest supported by probable cause
solely because the officers failed to secure a warrant." Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103,
113 (1975) (citations omitted). The allowance of arrests without a warrant "represents a
necessary accommodation between the individual's right to liberty and the State's duty to
control crime." /d. at 112. The Court recognizes that "[m]aximum protection ofindivid
ual rights could be assured by requiring a magistrate's review of the factual justification
prior to any arrest, but such a requirement would constitute an intolerable handicap for
legitimate law enforcement." la. at 113.
6. Because the fourth amendment protects against "unfounded invasions of liberty
and privacy," la. at ll2, the standard for arrest has been set at "probable cause." la.
This has been defined in terms of facts and circumstances "sufficient to warrant a pru
dent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense."
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). This standard allows for mistakes on the part of the
police as long as the mistakes are those of reasonable persons. It does not permit a
police officer to arrest a person based on suspicion, hunch, or "for investigation." Rather,
Objective and substantial evidence is necessary to justify such a "seizure." See Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 177 (1949) (officer's "whim, caprice or mere suspicion"
insufficient).
The probable cause standard has existed for many years, see, e.g., Albrecht v.
United States, 273 U.S. 1,5 (1927), and has withstood various efforts by its opponents to
allow the police to make arrests on a less stringent standard. A proposed Uniform Arrest
Act, adopted by three states, authorizes short-term detention on less than probable cause.
Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REv. 315 (1942). As demonstrated by Ger
stein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), and the cases cited therein, the Supreme Court has
steadfastly maintained the probable cause standard. la. at 112.
7. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
8. In order to minimize the effects of police mistakes, "the Court has required that
the existence of probable cause be decided by a neutral and detached magistrate when
ever possible." 420 U.S. at 112. The basis for this has been described as follows:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zeal
ous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual infer
ences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in
requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enter
prise of ferreting out crime.
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948). As a compromise, in some situations
police are allowed to exercise their discretion on the spot and make arrests without a
judicial review of the factual circumstances; however, a prompt subsequent review by a
judicial officer is required. This compromise was recently described by the Supreme
Court as follows:
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for a probable cause determination by a judicial officer. 9 The prose
cutor in Gerstein contended that his decision to file an information
was a sufficient determination of probable cause. The Court, how
ever, concluded that the "prosecutorial judgment standing alone
[does not meet] the requirements of the Fourth Amendment."10 In
reaching this conclusion, the Court stressed the need for an assess
ment of probable cause by someone independent of police and
prosecution. I I
The critical holding of Gerstein is that "the Fourth Amendment
requires a timely judicial determination of probable cause as a pre
requisite to detention."12 While Gerstein provides a constitutional
Under this practical compromise, a policeman's on-the-scene assessment of
probable cause provides legal justification for arresting a person suspected of
crime, and for a brief period of detention to take the administrative steps inci
dent to arrest. Once the suspect is in custody, however, the reasons that justify
dispensing with the magistrate's neutral judgment evaporate. There no longer
is any danger that the suspect will escape or commit further crimes while the
police submit their evidence to a magistrate. And, while the State's reasons for
taking summary action subside, the suspect's need for a neutral determination
of probable cause increases significantly. The consequences of prolonged de
tention may be more serious than the interference occasioned by arrest. Pretrial
confinement may imperil the suspect's job, interrupt his source of income, and
impair his family relationships. . . . Even pretrial release may be accompanied
by burdensome conditions that effect a significant restraint of liberty. . . .
When the stakes are this high, the detached judgment of a neutral magistrate is
essential if the Fourth Amendment is to furnish meaningful protection from
unfounded interference with liberty. . . . Accordingly, we hold that the Fourth
Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequi
site to extended restraint of liberty following arrest.
Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 113-14 (citations omitted).
9. In contrast, a person arrested pursuant to a warrant would have received a prior
judicial determination of probable cause.
10. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 117.
II. Id. at 118. See also United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S.
297,316-17 (1972); Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-53 (1971); Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1,5 (1927).
12. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 126. It did not, however, require that the determination
be made in an adversary context. Rather, the Court indicated that the fourth amend
ment protection could be provided in a variety of ways.
There is no single preferred pretrial procedure, and the nature of the probable
cause determination usually will be shaped to accord with a State's pretrial pro
cedure viewed as a whole. While we limit our holding to the precise require
ment of the Fourth Amendment, we recognize the desirability of flexibility and
experimentation by the States. It may be found desirable, for example, to make
the probable cause determination at the suspect's first appearance before a judi
cial officer,. . . or the determination may be incorporated into the procedure
for setting bail or fixing other conditions of pretrial release. In some States,
existing procedures may satisfy the requirement of the Fourth Amendment.
Others may require only minor adjustment, such as acceleration of existing pre
liminary hearings. . . . Whatever procedure a State may adopt, it must pro
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basis for requiring a prompt judicial determination of probable
cause, federal law has long required that arrested persons be brought
before a magistrate without unnecessary delay.13 This requirement
has not unduly interfered with the processing of criminal cases in the
federal courts.
The Gerstein requirement of prompt judicial determinations of
probable cause can easily be accommodated under existing proce
dures. Indiana law allows police to make warrantless arrests, but the
legislature, similar to many other states,14 has also mandated early
judicial determinations of probable cause. One statute requires that
a person arrested without a warrant be brought before a court within
twenty-four hours in most situations. IS Other provisions, not quite as
vide a fair and reliable determination of probable cause as a condition for any
significant pretrial constraint of liberty, and this determination must be made
by a judicial officer either before or promptly after arrest.
Id. at 123-25.
13. In McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), and Mallory v. United
States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its judicial supervision
of the federal criminal justice system, prohibited the use of evidence obtained during
lengthy delays between the arrest of suspects and their initial appearance before a magis
trate. The decisions were based on Rule 5(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
which provides:
An officer making an arrest under a warrant issued upon a complaint or
any person making an arrest without a warrant shall take the arrested person
without unnecessary delay before the nearest available federal magistr:ate or, in
the event that a federal magistrate is not reasonably available, before a state or
local judicial officer authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3041 [(1982»).
14. At least forty-one states and territories have statutes requiring that arrested
persons be promptly brought before a magistrate. See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAiGN
MENT PROCEDURE 256-57 app. I (Tent. Draft No.6, 1974). These statutes typically pro
vide that the appearance shall be "immediately," "without unnecessary delay," "with
reasonable promptness" or within a set time period. Id. Both these statutes and the
constitutional holding in Gerstein reflect long-standing practice.
At common law it was customary, if not obligatory, for an arrested person to be
brought before a justice of the peace shortly after arrest. 2 M. Hale, Pleas of the
Crown 77,81,95,121 (1736); 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 116-17 (4th ed.
1762). See also Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487, 498-499 (1885). The justice of
the peace would "examine" the prisoner and the witnesses to determine
whether there was reason to believe the prisoner had committed a crime. . . .
This practice furnished the model for criminal procedure in America immedi
ately following the adoption of the Fourth Amendment,. . . and there are indi
cations that the Framers of the Bill of Rights regarded it as a model for a
"reasonable" seizure. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. at 317-320 (Doug
las, J., dissenting).
Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114-16 (footnotes omitted).
15. IND. CODE ANN. § 36-8-3-11 (Burns 1981) provides:
Whenever an arrest has been made by a police officer, the officer making
the arrest shall bring the person arrested before the court having jurisdiction of
the offense, to be dealt with according to law. If the arrest is made during the
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specific, also require an early appearance before a judicial officer. 16
These provisions illustrate a legislative intent to insure that all war
rantless arrests be reviewed promptly by a judicial officer. If the ju
dicial officer finds probable cause for the arrest, then detention or
conditioned release is appropriate. If probable cause is not found,
immediate release is mandatory.
In Indiana, moreover, the purpose of the initial appearance
before a judicial officer is not limited to a probable cause determina
tion. The Indiana Supreme Court has articulated four purposes of
this appearance:
(1) Advise the arrestee of the charges against him; (2) Advise the
arrestee of his constitutional rights; (3) Provide arrestee with an
attorney if arrestee was without funds to hire one; (4) Determine
whether there is sufficient evidence that the crime charged has
been committed and the accused committed it. 17

Thus, the prompt appearance required by Gerstein can easily be ac
commodated within the statutory scheme as interpreted by the Indi
ana Supreme Court.
Against this background, it is instructive to examine practices
uncovered in several Indiana counties. While it is not suggested that
the abuses found in these counties exist throughout the nation, they
may be far too representative. 18 At a minimum, they demonstrate
hours when court is not in session, or if the judge is not holding court, the
person shall be detained in jail until there is an opportunity for a hearing at the
earliest practicable time or until he is released on bail. But a person may not be
detained longer than twenty-four (24) hours except when Sunday intervenes, in
which case a person may not be detained longer than forty-eight (48) hours.
In Grooms v. Fervida, 396 N.E.2d. 405, 411 (Ind. 1979), it was held that this section,
formerly IND. CODE § 18-1-11-8 (1978), applies only to city and town police, and not
county police.
16. See generally, IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-7-1-7 (Bums Supp. 1983).
17. Nacoffv. State, 256 Ind. 97,102, 267 N.E.2d 165, 168 (1971). More recently, in
Williams v. State, 264 Ind. 664, 348 N.E.2d. 623 (1976), the Indiana Supreme Court cited
Nacojf in stating that "[d]etention beyond a reasonable period necessary to bring a sus
pect before a magistrate is illegal,"ld at 671,348 N.E.2d at 629, and Gerstein in recogniz
ing the importance of "protecting citizens from illegal procedures which insulate arrested
persons from judicial safeguards."
18. The statistics compiled through discovery in. the two cases discussed below,
infra text accompanying notes 20-28, are unique in that they represent some of the few
instances in which these abuses have been documented with such detail. Police depart
ments and court personnel do not keep records of illegal arrests and delays in presenting
arrestees to the court. Despite the lack of hard statistics, observers have long suspected
that these illegal practices are common. See, e.g. , Foote, Safeguards in the Law ofArrest,
42 Nw. U. L. REV. 16,20-27 (1952); LAFAVE, ARREST 437-82 (1965). A generation ago
unconstitutional arrests were estimated to number several million per year. Hall, Police
and Law in a Democratic Society, 28 IND. L.J. 133, 152-54 (1953).
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the need for law enforcement officials in all communities to scruti
nize closely their practices.
One of the most serious abuses by law enforcement officials 19
was found in Lake County, Indiana, and it led to the far-reaching
opinion of Judge Sharp in Dommer v. Halcher. 20 The Gary, Indiana
police department had developed a practice of jailing persons on
"suspicion" and holding them while investigations were conducted
to establish probable cause. Numerous persons were jailed under
this practice-often for extended periods-bifore they were charged
with a specific crime. As a result, neither a determination of prob
able cause by a judicial officer nor the opportunity for release
through bail was available. The Dommer case challenged both the
holding on "suspicion" and the delay in initial court appearance. 21
Because anyone with access to counsel would quickly be freed
through a habeas corpus petition or the threat of a petition, it was
not surprising that most of the persons detained in accordance with
this practice were indigent and without legal counsel.
Referring to this "extensive abuse of plaintiffs' rights," the dis
trict court in Dommer observed:
[I]n the one-year period from March, 1973, through March,
1974, defendants have admitted holding thirty-one (31) individu
als, twelve (12) of whom were never charged, but were held in jail
an average of. . . eleven and four tenth (11.4) days before being
released. The remaining nineteen (19) individuals were held an
average of. . . [8.1] days before being charged with an offense.
Defendants have also admitted that during the four month period
from May, 1974, through August 26, 1974, thirty-seven (37) indi
viduals were held, fifteen (15) of which were never charged, but
were incarcerated an average of six and eight tenth (6.8) days
19. Rather than attempt to allocate blame between the police, prosecutors and
judges, we will simply include all of them as law enforcement officials with some respon
sibility to guard against the abuses discussed here.
20. 427 F Supp. 1040 (N.D. Ind. 1975), rev'd in part sub. nom., Dommer v. Craw
ford, 653 F.2d. 289 (7th Cir. 1981). The Seventh Circuit reversed the lower court only
insofar as the relief included the prosecutor who had not been in office when the facts
arose. Otherwise, the relief was affirmed.
21. There are two possible points of delay between arrest and initial court appear
ance: one between the arrest and filing of a criminal charge and the other between the
filing of a criminal charge and the actual court appearance. Extensive delay at either of
these points is contrary to both Indiana statutes and the United States Constitution.
Wherever the delay and whatever the cause, it results in the indigent accused being con
fined in what is often a less-than-decent facility, isolated from the detached, impartial
officer ultimately responsible for the fairness of the system, the judge. This situation
exists despite the fact that the accused is presumed to be innocent at this point.
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before being released. The remaining twenty-four (24) were held
an average of five (5) days before being charged. 22

While this information is alarming, the court's opinion understated
the full breadth of the problem. Discovery obtained through war
rant records and daily jail logs indicates that during February, 1974
at least 158 of 370 inmates (43%) were held for three days or longer
without being charged. The records also reveal that February was
fairly typical. A sampling of 106 cases of persons jailed for more
than three days between March, 1973 and August, 1974 demon
strates that people were being held up to twenty-five days without
charge and that incarceration from four to ten days was not at all
uncommon. 23
A greater abuse of the police power can hardly be imagined,
and it is tragic that the practice was allowed to continue as long as it
did. While the system provided a prompt remedy for those with
counsel (who could quickly file a writ of habeas corpus), this was not
feasible for indigents without counsel. No one knows how many
persons lost jobs or suffered other serious consequences as a result of
the illegal detention. Also unknown is the number of persons who
were eventually released without being charged, or, if charged, were
22. 427 F. Supp. at 1041-42.
23. See generally, Requests for Admissions filed in Dommer on Apr. 17, 1974, and
Sept. 26, 1974, and response filed Oct. 24, 1974. Some of this can be graphically
illustrated:
A. Percentage of Inmates Heldfor Investigation More than J Days Without Charges.
100%
80%
60%
40%

20%
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Total No.
of Inmates

'-----

V

----

~~

/

~ .--------

Apr. I May I June I July I Aug. I Sept. I Oct. I Nov. I Jan. I
1973
1974
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
1973
34
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34

33
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37

(53%)

(41%)

(54%)

(76%)
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(54%)
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eventually acquitted or had the charges dismissed.
Another type of abuse, perhaps more prevalent throughout the
state,24 was found in Delaware County, Indiana, where arrestees,
though promptly charged, were not promptly brought before a judi
cialofficer. The plaintiff in Fox v. Jordan 25 was arrested on Septem
ber 27, 1978 and not brought before a court for his arraignment until
more than seven days had passed. Because of his indigency, he was
able neither to post the set bail nor obtain counsel to seek his release
from jail. When Fox was finally brought before a judicial officer on
October 5, 1978, he pleaded not guilty and was released on his own
recognizance. In the interim, Fox lost his job. 26
Discovery in the Fox case reveals that during the months of Au
gust to October, 1978, approximately seventy-five percent of the per
sons arrested and held in the Delaware County Jail were not brought
before a judicial officer within twenty-four hours of their arrests,
contrary to Indiana law. Over half of the persons arrested waited
more than two days for their initial court appearance. Several
B. Number

of Days Held
13
12

/\ 1\
I \ I \ ;1
I \I V

11

Number

0/
Prisoners

10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2

Without Charges-106 Inmates Jailed Between March, 1973,
and August, 1974:

V

j
J

I

t

J
J

\

I

,

-"

1

II
1
2

4

6

8
Number

10

\
J
12

\

I"'.
/\

~j

14

of Days Held

16

~

VV

18

20

22

V
24

26

Without Charges

It should be noted that juveniles and persons with mental health problems were included
among those being held.
24. American University Criminal Courts Technical Assistance Project, The Struc
ture and Funding/or Criminal Defense of Indigents in Indiana 24 (1974). This survey
noted that in some Indiana counties the initial appearance in court may be delayed a
week. Often this results from the practice of scheduling only one arraignment day per
week.
25. No. IP 78-643-C (S.D. Ind., filed Oct. 5, 1978).
26. Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Attachment A, Fox (dated June
14,1979).
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waited a full week. 27 Most of these persons were victims of a prac
tice which limited arraignments to one day per week in non-traffic
cases28 and therefore the length of one's detention depended solely
on the day of arrest. Again, the role of counsel is crucial at this stage
because counsel could likely get an appearance before a judge, at
least for purposes of considering a bail reduction. Absent counsel,
the detained person must simply wait until the next day for a court
appearance.
One would like to think that the practices documented in Dom
mer and Fox are isolated. However, there is no reason to assume
that those situations are atypical and have been corrected. An even
more recent example was found in Kokomo, Howard
County, Indiana. The practice there combined the worst aspects of
the practices in Lake and Delaware Counties. When an arrest was
made without a warrant, the arrestee would wait in jail up to several
days while the arresting officer prepared a written report for the
prosecutor. After the prosecutor received the report there would be
another delay until a charge was filed and the court issued a warrant
indicating the amount of bail.
Another day or two often passed before the warrant was served
on the detained arrestee. If the arrestee could post the bond at that
time, he would be released and given an arraignment date. But if the
arrestee could not post bond, there would be an additional delay un
til the first court appearance because there was no formal procedure
for scheduling. arraignment of incarcerated persons. When finally
brought before the court for arraignment-the arrestee's first court
appearance-rounsel would normally be appointed and the arraign
27. Id. Attachments B-1 and B-2. This data can be graphically illustrated also:
Number of Persons Held in Delaware County Jail for Various Periods of Time 
August - October,
Hours Held
Number of Prisoners
46
0-24
34
24-48
37
48-72
II
72-96
29
96-102
12
120-144
10
144-168
16~192
3
2
192-216

---=---

Total
184
28. Deposition of defendant prosecutor, Jordan, at 36. This is similar to, but worse
than, the practice noted by the Indiana Court of Appeals in Grooms v. Fervida, 396
N.E.2d at 408.
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ment would be postponed further. 29
A good example of the impact of the Howard County practices
is found in the case of an individual arrested for shoplifting in late
November, 1980. The person was incarcerated in the county jail for
fifteen days until charges were filed and did not appear in court until
the twenty-third day after his arrest, at which time he was tried and
acquitted. It is not known how much longer the delay would have
been had the person's sister not appeared at the courthouse on the
fifteenth day after his arrest to inquire about his status. At that time
she was referred to an attorney who was in court on other matters
and he was able to intervene and have the case set for prompt trial,30
The fact that these situations have continued to exist demon
strates the urgent need for law enforcement officials and courts to
examine closely the procedures between arrest and initial court ap
pearance, at least when the arrest is made without a warrant. Even if
officials are not particularly concerned about the constitutional
rights of the persons arrested, such a review should be conducted
because of the expense of pre-trial detention3l and because illegal
detention can subject the responsible officials to damage actions.32
The evils of delays in appearance before a judicial officer are partic
ularly acute for those incarcerated during the interim and, not sur
prisingly, there is reason to suggest that the illegal practices
described here are concentrated in the poor and minority communi
ties. 33 With few exceptions, persons incarcerated prior to the initial
court appearance are those without the resources necessary to obtain
their freedom.
III.

PRE-TRIAL DETENTION-THE INEQUITIES OF A SYSTEM
WHICH CONDITIONS RELEASE ALMOST SOLEY ON
ABILITY TO PAY

Intertwined with the aspect of the system described above and
29. Interview with Dan J. May, Kokomo attomey(December 1980). Mr. May has
practiced criminal law in Howard County for several years.
30. Id. The practice in Howard County was apparently corrected in January,
1981. An article in a local newspaper reported that as of January 19, 1981 a judge would
be available each morning to review arrests made without a warrant, determine prob
able cause, set bail, and advise the persons arrested of their rights. Kokomo Tribune,
Jan. 18, 1981, at 1.
31. See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., Grooms v. Fervida, 396 N.E.2d 405,411 (Ind. 1979).
33. See, e.g. , PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMIN
ISTRATION OF JUSTICE: TASK FORCE REPORT- THE POLICE 178-89 (1967); Note, Phila
delphia Police Practice and the Law of Arrest, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 1182 (1952).
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extending through trial is the impact of the money-based bail sys
tem. Most of the human and legal concerns expressed above disap
pear if the accused is released promptly after arrest. Such early
release is available, almost without exception, to those who have the
financial resources to purchase their freedom. Release on some form
of bail presumes, of course, that a criminal charge has been at least
tentatively identified. 34 Since persons charged with criminal offenses
are presumed innocent until the state proves otherwise, the state's
sole interest in detaining them prior to trial is to assure that they will
appear in court when required. 35 This means that persons arrested
should be released pending trial unless there is some reason to be
lieve they will not make court appearances.
The historical and, in many states, the current means of preserv
ing the presumption of innocence while also serving the state's inter
est in assuring court appearances has been to require the posting of
monetary bail. 36 This is normally done by executing a bond with an
insurance company providing the surety. Generally, a premium of
ten percent of the total bail is paid to a surety bondsman who makes
a commitment to either produce the accused in court when sched
uled or forfeit the total amount of the bail. As this ten percent pre
mium is not returned to the accused, regardless of whether court
appearances are made, there is little financial incentive for the de
fendant to appear.
There is no better example of the inequities of money bail than
the situation presented to the federal court in the case of Mudd v.
Busse. 37 This class action, brought by two individuals incarcerated
in the Allen County jail in Fort Wayne, Indiana, sought to reform
the bail practices of the Allen Circuit Court which relied almost ex
clusively on money bail and where the initial amount of bail was
based on a master bond schedule. Because the Allen Superior Court
had implemented a bail project which provided for release on one's
34. The situation described in Dommer was particularly offensive because people
were being held on mere suspicion without the identification of a criminal charge.
Therefore the opportunity to post bail was not even available until the police investiga
tion was completed and a charge filed.
35. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. I (1951); Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998 (7th Cir. 1976);
Hobbs v. Lindsey, 240 Ind. 74, 162 N.E.2d 85 (1959). Preventive detention may fre
quently be the real, but unarticulated, reason for pre-trial incarceration. See infro notes
67, 79 and accompanying text.
36. The right to bail is found in the eighth amendment to the U.S. Constitution
and Art. I, Section 17 of the Indiana Constitution. Indiana law, IND. CODE ANN. § 35
33-8-3(1)(Burns Supp. 1983) expressly provides for the use of a surety.
37. 68 F.R.D. 522 (N.D. Ind. 1975),437 F. Supp. 505 (N.D. Ind. 1977), q/f'd, 582
F.2d 1283 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 43.9 U.S. 1078 (1979).
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own recognizance or non-monetary conditions, the availability of
pre-trial release in Allen County often depended upon the court se
lected by the state. Under the local practice, the prosecuting attor
ney had the unfettered discretion to choose between these two courts.
The named plaintiffs in Mudd graphically illustrate the inequity and
arbitrariness of the system.
Both plaintiffs had been arrested in late November, 1974, on
preliminary charges of burglary which were filed in the superior
court. After officials of the bail project conducted their normal in
quiry, both were released without being required to post any mone
tary bai1. One of them had been similarly released by the project on
an earlier charge, and both made their scheduled court appearances.
In early December, the prosecutor filed the formal charges for the
same burglary against the two plaintiffs in the circuit court which
refused to participate in the bail project. Bond was set at $5,000, the
amount prescribed by the master bond schedule. 38 As a result, there
was no individual determination as to whether a $5,000 bond, or any
bond, was necessary to assure their appearance in court. Their prior
history of making court appearances was not considered. Because of
their indigency, neither plaintiff was able to obtain his release from
jail at that time. 39
This led to the initiation of the federal court action in which the
plaintiffs argued that the Constitution, because of the presumption of
innocence and the deprivation of their fundamental right to free
dom, required the courts to use the least restrictive means available
to assure that the accused will appear in court as scheduled. In any
case, the least restrictive condition would obviously be an outright
release based on the accused's promise to appear in court. There
fore, it was argued that other non-monetary conditions could be im
posed only if the state demonstrated that an outright release would
not be· sufficient to assure appearance. Examples of such conditions
would include reporting to an officer of the court, restrictions on
leaving the county, maintenance of employment, and deposit of a
refundable ten percent of the bond with the court.40 Only in extreme
cases might money bail be justified.41
38. 437 F. Supp. at 508.
39. See generally, Pre-Trial Order, Mudd (filed April 4, 1977).
40. See the Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.c. § 3146(a)(1982), and IND.
COD ANN. § 35-33-8-3 (Bums Supp. 1983) for an indication of other non-monetary con
ditions available.
41. The Mudd case was never decided on the merits because, after certifying a
class, the federal court determined that principles of federalism and comity prevented it
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As part of the preparation of the plaintiffs case in Mudd, an
extensive study42 was made of the bail system as it operated in Allen
County to determine how it affected indigent persons accused of a
crime. The study examined 411 closed criminal felony cases filed in
the circuit court during 1974 and 1975. Its primary purpose was to
determine whether pre-trial detention affected the outcome in crimi
nal cases. Most significantly, the study confirmed what was already
generally believed: that pre-trial detention adversely affected the
outcome of a criminal case. Those detained prior to trial were more
likely to be convicted and much more likely to be sentenced to
prison than those released prior to trial. 43
The evidence showed that persons charged in the circuit court
and detained prior to trial were convicted fifteen percent more often
and sentenced to prison sixty percent more often than those who
were released on bail immediately upon arrest.44 In other words,
seven out of ten persons detained prior to trial received a prison term
compared to only one out of ten persons released upon arrest. This
unfavorable relationship between pre-trial incarceration and ulti
mate outcome was tested by examining other variables that might
explain the observed disparity. These included the type of crime
charged, prior criminal record of the accused, type of counsel, race,
and amount of final bail imposed. 45 None of the factors, considered
individually and collectively, explained the disparity in outcome be
tween those detained and those released prior to trial. Consistently,
from becoming involved in the issue. 437 F. Supp. at 510-13. This determination to
avoid the merits was made, however, only after the conclusion of discovery and the mat
ter had been submitted to the court for a ruling on the merits of cross-motions for sum
mary judgment.
42. See infra Appendix A.
43. See, e.g. , Ares, Rankin & Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim Report
on the Use of Pretrial Parole, 38 N.Y. U.L. REv. 67 (1963); Wald, Pretrial Dentention and
Ultimate Freedom: A Statistical Study, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 631, 633 (1964); Wilson, New
Approaches to Pretrial Detention, 39 KAN. BAR ASS'N 13, IS (1970); Note, An Answer to
the Problem ofBail' A Proposal in Need ofEmpirical Confirmation, 9 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROB. 394,402-03 (1973); Note,A Study of the Administration ofBail in New York City,
106 U. PA. L. REv. 693, 726-27 (1958); Note, Compelling Appearance in Court: Adminis
tration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 1051-54 (1954); Ervin, Preventive
Detention-A Step Backward for Criminal Justice, 6 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 291, 347
(1971).
44. See infra Appendix A at 309-10.
45. This process, known as elaboration, tests an observed relationship between two
primary variables by examining other variables that might be responsible for the rela
tionship. Thus, if the relationship between the primary variables disappears when the
third variable is held constant, it is said to "explain" the relationship. However, if the
relationship between the primary variables still holds when the third variable is intro
duced, then the new variable does not explain the relationship. If no variable can be
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detained arrestee's were convicted more often and sentenced much
more severely than those who were released. This strongly suggests
that there is a causal relationship between pre-trial detention and
outcome in criminal cases.46
The causal relationship found in the study is not unique to Al
len County, Indiana. In fact it is one of the defects listed by Profes
sor Zeisel in his criticism of money bail.
The American bail system has been under serious criticism
on a variety of grounds. It has been charged with three specific
failures, all of which discriminate against the indigent defendant
found to explain the relationship between the primary variables, it can be concluded that
the relationship is causal.
In this study, the elaboration analysis examines the apparent correlation between
pretrial status and outcome (the "independent" and "dependent" variables respectively)
by investigating other factors, such as prior criminal record, type of counsel, etc. (the
"test" variables), that might be responsible for this relationship. First, the relation be
tween a particular factor (e.g., type of crime) and pretrial status is examined; next, the
relationship between that factor and outcome is examined. According to the logic of
elaboration, if there is no significant correlation between the factor examined and pretrial
status and/or outcome (e.g. , if type of crime does not make detention or conviction more
likely), then that factor cannot explain the relationship between pretrial status and out
come. If, however, there is a positive correlation between the factor and both pretrial
status and outcome (e.g., if type of crime makes detention and conviction more likely),
that factor may explain the relationship.
To test whether this factor (type of crime) or any of the other test variables account
for the relationship between pretrial status and outcome, that factor must be held con
stant and the relationship between status and outcome must be reexamined. If the dis
parity in outcome between the detained and the released no longer exists when this is
done (e.g. , if persons accused of robbery have the same conviction rate whether they are
detained or released), then that factor explains the relationship, and pretrial status is
shown not to have had a causal impact on outcome. On the other hand, if the disparity
persists when the factor under examination is held constant, then the factor does not
explain the relationship. This process is repeated with all relevant factors and, if none is
found which explains the relationship between pretrial status and outcome, then the rela
tionship is causal. This study examines such factors, one by one, and also in combina
tion. See infra Appendix A at 310-22.
46. The authors realize that the statistical methods utilized here might have been
supplemented with other methods, e.g. , a multivariate analysis. It is not our goal, how
ever, to prove to a legal certainty through statistics that there are defects in the system.
Rather, we are attempting to call attention to certain aspects of the system which need
closer scrutiny at the official level. The evidence does demand a serious consideration of
certain reforms.
The present study and its results are similar to the one conducted in New York City
about the effects of bail. Dr. Eric Single was responsible for both studies. See Single,
The Unconstitutional Administration ofBail' Bellamy II. Judges ofNew York City, 8 CRIM.
L. BULL. 459 (1972). A methodological critique of that study is contained in Hindelang,
On the Methodological Rigor of the Bellamy Memorandum, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 507 (1972).
After noting a number of statistical shortcomings, the critique concludes that the evi
dence is "persuasive that making bail is a factor important to outcome." Id. at 513.
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who cannot make bail: (1) that it keeps in jail defendants who
would have returned to court if they had been released, some of
whom are not even convicted; (2) that it releases defendants who
should not have been released; (3) that the very fact of pre-trial
detention increases the likelihood that defendants will be con
victed and, if convicted, will receive a custody sentence. 47

Professor Zeisel termed the relationship between pre-trial incarcera
tion and conviction and sentencing, "the most serious congenital de
fect of the system."48 Another comprehensive study found that "the
convicted person who had been held in lieu of bail had a 25 percent
greater chance of getting a prison sentence than the convicted person
who made bail."49
The correlation between pre-trial incarceration and increased
conviction and sentencing rates is not surprising at all. As Professor
Zeisel points out:
If a defendant at the time of sentencing has spent some time
in jail, the court will be tempted to make the time served "legal"
by imposing a jail sentence rather than allowing a "walk" sentence
that may raise doubts about the merits of the earlier imposed pre
trial detention. 50

There are other obvious reasons for this correlation. Not only is the
victim of pre-trial detention of little value to his counsel in the prep
aration of the defense, the pre-trial detainee is also subject to con
stant pressure to plead guilty. After several months of pre-trial
detention, even innocent persons enter a plea of guilty rather than
remain in jail indefinitely awaiting trial.5 1 In addition, the person
incarcerated prior to trial and sentencing has not had an opportunity
to develop a favorable record, maintenance of employment and fam
47. Zeisel, Bail Revisited, AM. B. FOUND.J. 769, 769 (1979).
48. Id. at 779.
49. HERMAN, SINGLE, BOSTON, COUNSEL FOR THE POOR 62 (1977).
SO. Zeisel, supra note 47, at 781.
S1. Zeisel, supra note 47, at 78S-87; Barkai, Accuracy Inquiries for All Felony and
Misdemeanor Pleas: Voluntary Pleas But Innocent Defendants? 126 PA. L. REv. 88,97,
(1977); Finkelstein, A Statistical Analysis of Guilty Plea Practices in the Federal Courts, 89
HARV. L. REV. 293, 307-12 (197S); White, A Proposal/or Reform o/the Plea Bargaining
Process, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 439, 443-4S (1971). As to the impact of this factor in attack
ing a guilty plea, compare United States v. Barrett, SI4 F.2d 1241, 1242 (Sth Cir.
1975)Gail conditions prior to plea constituting cruel and unusual punishment did not
authorize vacating sentence and, in view of the artful pleadings, contention of coercion
could not be heard), with Pettyjohn v. United States, 419 F.2d 6SI, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(if the court is to uphold bargained pleas, it must also delineate the power and duty of the
trial court to conduct a further inquiry), cert. denied, 397 U.S. lOS8 (1970). Conditions in
jails certainly provide some pressure to plea bargain. See supra note 2.
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ily ties for example, which would argue strongly in favor of proba
tion rather than imprisonment. 52
This relationship between pre-trial status and case outcome de
mands that the system be reformed absent some compelling state in
terest in maintaining the system as operated in the circuit court. 53
The need for reform is further supported by the failure of the money
bail system to serve its purpose, assuring court appearances. A com
parison of the Allen Circuit Court with the superior court, which has
operated a bail services program since 1972, confirms that a less re
strictive means is available which better serves the state's interest in
several respects. Through the bail services program, acourt-ap
pointed commissioner interviews persons charged with a crime
within a few hours after their arrests to determine whether they
should be released on their own recognizance or conditions other
than monetary or property bond. The services of this project were
also available to the circuit court, but the judge chose not to partici
pate. 54 Allen County, therefore, provided an ideal situation for com
parison of the effectiveness of the two types of release in promoting
the state's sole interest in the pre-trial release process, ensuring an
accused's presence in court for all scheduled appearances.
To make this comparison, a second study was undertaken as
part of the Mudd case. It is based on 297 cases filed in the superior
court and 203 cases filed in the circuit court, representing all the fel
ony cases filed in the superior and circuit courts during 1976. The
data revealed that eighty-two percent of the defendants in the supe
rior court were released at some point prior to final disposition com
pared to only sixty-six percent of the defendants in the circuit

52. Under IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-lA-1O (Burns 1979), the pre-sentence investi
gation includes gathering information relating to employment history and family situa
tion. Id. Clearly, a person who is employed and able to support any dependents at the
time of sentencing can make a more persuasive argument for probation. Why should the
court disrupt a stable situation by imprisonment? STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
The Defense Function, commentary to Standards 4-3.6 and 10-1.1 (1980). While infor
mation on employment and family was not available through the sources used in Mudd
study (Appendix A) and therefore not included with the other variables examined, dis
ruption of employment and family ties is a necessary consequence of pretrial detention.
This helps explain why detention adversely affects sentencing.
53. It is indeed difficult to imagine any compelling state interest, particularly in
light of the fact that there seems to be an attractive alternative to money bail. See infra
notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
54. See generally, Pre-trial Order, Mudd (filed April 4, 1977).
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court. 55 This difference is very significant in light of the high costs of
detention, both to the detainees and their families and local taxpay
ers. There is also an important difference in the way defendants in
the two courts were released. The superior court released forty
seven percent of the persons through its bail services program. In
contrast, the circuit court relied primarily on surety bondsmen; sev
enty-nine percent of those released purchased a bail bond. 56
The study also showed that the bail services program not only
resulted in a greater percentage of arrestees being released, it was far
more successful in achieving the state's sole interest, appearance in
court. In the superior court, defendants who were released under the
bail services project were more than three times as likely to appear at
all court hearings as were those released through bondsmen. 57
Moreover, the ten defendants released by the bail project who
missed at least one court appearance missed a total of only fourteen
court appearances, whereas the thirty-four defendants released
through bondsmen missed a total of sixty-one court appearances. 58
55.

Pretrial Status by Court
Circuit

Released
Never Released
N.A.·

66
26

Superior

8

82
12
6

100%
(203)

100%
(297)

." N.A." means nonascertainable. These 14 cases are excluded from subsequent
analysis.
56.
Type 0/ Release by Court
Circuit
Superior
47
Bail Service
79·
45
Bondsmen
Cash or Property Posted
II
2
Court Releases (ROR)
3
6
4
Jailer's Release
N.S.
2
99%

100%

(134)
(244)
• Ninety-two percent (92%) of the 106 circuit court defendants released by bondsmen
were released by only two bondsmen.
57.
Appearance Rate by Type 0/ Release in Superior Court
Bail Project
Bondsmen
91
69
Appeared
9
31
Not Appeared
100%
(114)

58.

100%

(Ill)
Affidavit of Biesiada at 5-10, Brief of Appellants, A-78 to -80 app., Mudd.

282

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 6:263

Opponents of bail reform might respond to such statistics by
stating \hat bpndsmen get only the poor risks in the superior court
because the bail project gets the first opportunity to select the better
risks. But during the period studied, the bail services program in
Allen County released seventy-eight percent of all interviewed per
sons charged with a felony. 59 More significantly, similar nonappear
ance rates were found in the circuit court where, because the judge
did not participate in the bail project, bondsmen had the opportunity
to release both the good and bad risks. In fact, the nonappearance
rates of surety releases between the circuit and superior courts were
almost identical: thirty percent in circuit court and thirty-one per
cent in superior court.60 Moreover, the thirty-two defendants in the
circuit court who missed at least one court appearance missed a total
of sixty-three court hearings-a figure again strikingly similar to that
(sixty-one) obtained in the superior court.
The significantly higher nonappearance rate in cases which de
fendants were released through surety bondsmen is not surprising.
Because bondsmen keep the ten percent bond premium, whether or
not court appearances are made, defendants have no financial incen
tive to appear in court. Therefore, the money bail system not only
deprives persons of basic constitutional rights and imposes a dispro
portionate impact upon indigents, it is not as effective as lesser re
strictive alternatives in promoting the only legitimate state interest
- assuring court appearances.
What was found in Allen County, Indiana, is certainly not
unique to that community; it is probably typical of the bail system in
Indiana and the nation as a whole. Testimony at an early hearing in
the Mudd case suggested that there were only a few bail projects
operating in Indiana. 61 On the national level, one report identified
115 bail projects operating in the country as of mid-1975. 62 With
some variations, the general approach of such projects is to make an
59. Affidavit of James R. Seely at 11(dated May 9, 1977); Plaintiffs Motion for
Summary Judgment app., Mudd(filed May 16, 1977). Mr. Seely is the bail commissioner
of the Allen Superior Court.
60.
Appearance Rate ofSurety Releases by Court
Appeared
Not Appeared

Circuit

Superior

70
30

69
31

100%
(106)

100%
(Ill)

61. Mudd, 68 F.R.D. at 528.
62. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL EVALUATION PROGRAM PHASE I SUMMARY
REpORT: PRETRIAL RELEASE PROGRAMS 7 (1977). The projects identified were de
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individual determination, promptly after arrest, of the most relevant
factors tending to indicate whether or not the accused will make
scheduled court appearances. These factors typically include length
of residence in the community, employment status, family ties, prior
criminal record, character references, nature of the offense charged
and, if not the first offense, prior appearance record. The success of
these projects is generally accepted and they result in the release of
many accused persons prior to trial without posting any type of mon
etary or property bond. 63 This method both saves the taxpayers the
expense of unnecessary detention and protects the state's interest.
Despite the well-documented success of these bail reform
projects and the continuous criticism of money bail,64 many states
like Indiana continue to rely almost exclusively on the money bail
system. This is true even though, at an average cost of $20.00 per
day, it costs taxpayers nearly $20,000.00 per day to "house" the per
sons being held in Indiana jails awaiting tria1. 65 The most disturbing
element i.il most cases is that there has never been an individualized
judicial inquiry into the need for monetary bail. In most Indiana
scribed as "pretrial release programs that provided an alternative to the traditional
money bail system."
63. 'See generally, W. THOMAS, BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA (1976); Goldkamp,
Philadelphia Revisited' An Examination of Bail and IJetention Two IJecades After Foote
26 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 179 (April 1980); Report of the Director of the Adminis
trative Office of the United States Courts on the Operation of Title 11 of the Speedy Trial
Act of 1974 (Sept. 30, 1978).
64. Courts and commentators alike have written of its evils and inequities. Com
menting on the roles of the commercial bondsmen and the court, Judge J. Skelly Wright
has observed:
They [commercial bondsmen) determine for whom they will act as
surety-who in their judgment is a good risk. The bad risks, in the bondsmen's
judgment, and the ones who are unable to pay the bondsmen's fee, remain in
jail. The court and commissioner are relegated the relatively unimportant
choice of fixing the amount of bail.
Pannel v. United States, 320 F.2d 698, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1963); Comment, Constitutional
Law: Equal Protection/or Indigents in the Bail System, 17 WASHBURN L.J. 648 (1978);
Note, Bail in the United States: A System in Need of Reform, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 380
(1968); The Bail System: Is It Acceptable?, 29 OHIO ST.L.J. 1005 (1968); Rankin, The
Effect of Pretrial IJetention, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 641 (1964).
65. In Indiana, as of February 1978, there were approximately 2,453 persons being
held in local jails. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, LEAA, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS 1980, Table 6.8, at 482. At that time, on the national level there were 158,394
persons held in local jails, id., and roughly 40% of them were awaiting trial. Id., Table
6.10, at 483. Assuming the same percentage in Indiana, the daily population of persons
awaiting trial in Indiana jails is at least 980. The cost per day per inmate averages
around $20.00. This figure is based on the average charge to the federal government for
housing federal pre-trial detainees in local Indiana jails. Telephone conversation with
the office of the U.S. Marshall for the Northern District of Indiana(Aug. 1981).
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counties, bail is set pursuant to a schedule which takes into account
only the crime charged, not the individual accused. 66
If there are so many defects in the m()ney bail system, both in
terms of costs to taxpayers and the accused and in promoting the
state's interest in assuring appearance in court, the obvious question
is why has it been allowed to survive? There are several possible
explanations, but two seem most compelling: the insurance indus
try's self-interest in maintaining the status quo and law enforce
ment's inclination to use pre-trial detention as a preventive
measure. 67
The powerful insurance industry obviously has a vested interest
in maintaining the money bail system. Because the premium paid
for a bail bond is never returned, even after all of the appearances
are made as scheduled, bail bonding is very profitable. In Allen
County, Indiana, for example, during the three-year period of 1974
76, bondsmen wrote bonds totalling $1,243,000 for the 440 circuit
court defendants they released, of which they received ten percent or
$124,300. 68 As noted, in 1976 alone, thirty-two of their 106 clients
missed a total of sixty-three court appearances. Yet during the pe
riod 1974-76, only seven judgments were entered against bondsmen
in the total amount of $11,000. Bondsmen thus received a gross in
66. For example, the study of the Allen Circuit Court revealed that bond was set
pursuant to the master schedule in 77% of the cases. See infra Appendix A at 308.
Under Indiana law each court must adopt a bond schedule. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-8
4(a)(Burns Supp. 1983).
67. The merits and legality of preventive detention are currently the subject of
much debate. An attorney general task force recently came out in favor of preventive
detention. N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1981, at AI, col. 5. See also Kennedy, A New Approach
to Bail Release: The Proposed Federal Criminal Code and Bail Reform, 48 FORDHAM L.
REv. 423 (1980); Duke, Bail Reform/or the Eighties: A Reply to Senator Kennedy, 49
FORDHAM L. REv. 40 (1980); Castle, Trends Restricting the Right to Bail' The Constitu
tionality 0/Pretrial Detention in Non-Capital Offenses, 3 CRIM. JUST. J. 433 (1980); Flem
ming, Kohfeld & Uhlman, The Limits ofBail Reform: A Quasi-Experimental Analysis, 14
L. & SOC'Y REv. 947 (1980); Stevens, Preventive Detention and Equal Protection 0/ the
Law in Texas, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 133 (1978). A recent decision, Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d
1148 (8th Cir. 1981), vacated sub nom., Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478 (1982), raises ques
tions about the constitutionality of preventive detention. The court declared unconstitu
tional under the eighth amendment a provision of the Nebraska constitution which
denies bail to persons charged with certain sexual offenses. 648 F.2d at 1165. The
Supreme Court vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss based on mootness.
455 U.S. at 484. A New York statute, authorizing pretrial detention of juveniles where
there is a serious risk that the accused would commit certain crimes before his return
date, was found unconstitutional in Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982),
prob. juris. noted sub nom., Schall v. Martin, 103 S. Ct. 1765 (1983).
68. Two bondsmen wrote $1,072,000 (85%) of this amount. This information was
obtained as part of the second study in the Mudd case. See supra text accompanying
notes 55-60.
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come of $113,300·($124,300 minus $11,000) in a three-year period
.
alone. 69
For this profit, bondsmen are expected to apprehend the de
fendants and return them to court. Although data regarding their
success in this endeavor was not available, it is noteworthy that in
1976 the circuit court issued twenty-three bench warrants for the
sixty-three times surety-released defendants failed to appear. Thus,
in over one-third of their cases, bondsmen are assisted by law en
forcement officials in apprehending fugitives-a job which bonds
men are paid to do themselves.
This point is further demonstrated by some statistics from
California:
Last year [1979] bail bondsmen in California collectively
wrote bonds having a face value of approximately $350 million.
Ninety percent of these bonds were underwritten by just four in
surance or surety companies at little risk and enormous profit. In
order to protect their profits, these companies and their bondsman
agents, operating through professional lobbyists, annually mount
an effective campaign to defeat any bill that would modify, no
matter how modestly, the status quo. 70

Like California, in Indiana there are only a small number of insur
ance companies licensed to write surety bonds. 71 There is relatively
little risk in the business because the experience in Indiana suggests
that forfeiture of the bond is rarely ordered. 72
The intensity of the lobbying efforts by the industry is illustrated
by the recent conviction of an Indiana state senator for accepting
bribes from a lobbyist for the industry.73 Indiana is not the only
state in which there is evidence of illegal lobbying on behalf of
bondsmen. In the past several years, sixty-two court officials in three
states, including a Michigan Supreme Court justice, were convicted
69. This assumes the judgments were collected but the information available did
not indicate whether they had in fact been collected. Id.
70. Kline, The Politics of Bail Reform and tlte Needfor Judicial Intervention, U
WEST L.A. L. REV. I, 6 (1980).
71. A list supplied by the Indiana Department of Insurance in 1981 indicates there
are only six companies licensed to write surety bonds.
72. For the Allen County experience during 1974-76, see mpra text accompanying
notes 68-69. A telephone conversation with an Indiana Department of Insurance official
indicates there is no current statistical data available concerning this.
73. Indianapolis Star, Dec. 19, 1980, at I, col. 6. State Senator Martin K. Edwards
was convicted on several counts of bribery in attempts to influence bail bond legislation.
Id.
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of taking or extorting bribes from bail bondsmen. 74 The Federal
Trade Commission has investigated the bail bond industry for rate
fixing and rate-enforcing boycotts. 75 An example of an effective boy
cott is found in Tennessee where bondsmen protested a reform effort
by refusing to write bonds. The reform effort was withdrawn, when,
as a result of the boycott, the jail population tripled. 76
The efforts of bondsmen are not limited to lobbying. The pro
ject operated by the superior court was subjected to a court challenge
by a bondsman in Allen County.77 In Kentucky several suits were
filed by bondsmen after legislation outlawed commercial bail bond
ing entirely.78 The point is simply that the powerful insurance in
dustry is not allowing bail reform without a battle.
A second factor contributing to the maintenance of the bail sys
tem is that the prevailing mood in the country is not sympathetic
toward persons accused of crime. The presumption of innocence be
comes important to most people only when they have first-hand ex
perience with the criminal justice system. The current trend seems in
favor of legitimizing the use of bail to keep potentially dangerous
persons in jail prior to trial - a practice known as "preventive de
tention."79 Judges are obviously not immune from or out of touch
with this mood. The failure of the Allen Circuit Court to participate
in the bail services project is an excellent example of how firmly the
monetary bail system is entrenched.
The need for reform is obvious but it has not progressed rapidly
despite efforts by well-respected organizations such as the American
Bar Association. 80 Probably the most comprehensive reform is the
Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966,81 which requires that any person
charged with an offense, other than one punishable by death,
shall, at his appearance before a judicial officer, be ordered re
leasedpending trial on his personal recognizance or upon the exe
74. DeRhoda, Whither 'he Bail Bondsmen?, NAT'L L.J. Jan. 22, 1979.
75. Id. See also, e.g.,In re Texas Ass'n of Professional Surs. & Ass'n of Profes
sional Surs. of Houston, 95 F.T.C. 300 (1980).
76. DeRhoda, supra note 74, at 1.
77. Lee v. Bail Comm'rs, No. C-76-153 (Adams Cir. Ct., dismissed Nov. 30, 1976).
The plaintiff in this case is one of the bondsmen referred to supra note 68.
78. See Ky. REv. STAT. § 304.34-010(1)(1981). See also Benboe v. Carroll, 625
F.2d 737 (6th Cir. 1980); Johnson Bonding Co. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 420
F.Supp. 331 (E.D. Ky. 1976); Stephens v. Bonding Ass'n, 538 S.W.2d 580 (Ky. 1976).
79. See supra note 67.
80. See generally ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE (Approved
Draft 1968).
81. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-52 (1982).
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cution of an unsecured appearance bond in an amount specified
by the judicial officer, subject to the condition that such person not
commit an offense under [certain statutes], unless the officer deter
mines, in the exercise of his discretion, that such a release will not
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required. 82

To some extent, this presumption of release absent a showing of a
need for conditions has been achieved in California through a recent
state supreme court decision. 83 The federal act goes further and re
quires, when the judicial officer determines something other than
personal recognizance is necessary, that the least restrictive means of
assuring appearance be used. It requires that the officer "impose the
first [of a list of] conditions of release which will reasonably assure
the appearance of the person for trial."84 The judicial officer is fur
ther required, in determining which conditions to impose, to take
into account certain specified individual circumstances. 85
In addition to the federal reform, a few states have enacted re
form legislation. The Kentucky law imposing an absolute ban on
commercial bail bonding has been previously discussed. 86 Oregon,
while not banning bail bonding entirely, has established a range of
alternatives which have had the effect of eliminating many bail
82. 18 U.S.C. § 3 I 46(a) (1982) (emphasis added).
83. Van Atta v. Scott, 27 Cal. 3d 424,613 P.2d 210, 166 Cal. Rptr. 149 (1980).
84. 18 U.S.c. § 3 146(a) (1982). The possible conditions are:
(1) place the person in the custody of a designated person or organization
agreeing to supervise him;
(2) place restrictions on the travel, association, or place of abode of the
person during the period of release;
(3) require the execution of an appearance bond in a specified amount and
the deposit in the registry of the court, in cash or other security as directed, of a
sum not to exceed 10 per centum of the amount of the bond, such deposit to be
returned upon the performance of the conditions of release;
(4) require the execution of a bail bond with sufficient solvent sureties, or
the deposit of cash in lieu thereof; or
(5) impose any other condition deemed reasonably necessary to assure ap
pearance as required, including a condition requiring that the person return to
custody after specified hours.

Id.
85. 18 U.S.C. § 3 I 46(b) (1982).
[T1he nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the evi
dence against the accused, the accused's family ties, employment, financial re
sources, character and mental condition, the length of his residence in the
community, his record of convictions, and his record of appearance at court
proceedings or of flight to avoid prosecution or failure to appear at court
proceedings.
Id. These are similar to factors considered by projects which release on the inmate's own
recognizance (ROR).
86. . See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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bondsmen. The Oregon law provides that the judge shall impose the
least onerous condition necessary to assure a defendant's appearance
at trial. 87
Illinois was one of the first states to enact bail reform legislation
with what has become known as the "ten percent deposit plan."88
Under this system a defendant posts ten percent of the amount of the
bond directly with the court clerk and, upon meeting all scheduled
court appearances, most of the deposit is retumed. 89 The obvious
advantage of this system is that, unlike a system utilizing bonding
companies, it gives the accused a financial incentive to make the
scheduled court appearances. 90
The "ten percent deposit plan" was approved by the Indiana
Court of Appeals in a case upholding the inherent power of trial
courts to give the accused an option of either using a surety bond, a
property bond, a full cash bond or posting ten percent of the total
bond with the court clerk.91 This result was codified in 1980 with the
87. OR. REV. STAT. § 135.230-290 (1981). In Burton v. Tomlinson, 19 Or. App.
247,255, 527 P.2d 123, 128 (1974), the court rejected a challenge by bondsmen to the
Oregon statute, stating:
Because the legislature saw fit to greatly enlarge the opportunities of a defend
ant for release prior to judgment, with resulting drastic diminution in the de
mand for plaintiffs' services, it did not thereby deprive them of property but, at
most, only of the benefit to them ftowing from the previously existing status
quo.
Id.
88. ILL. AMi. STAT. ch. 38, § 110-7 (Smith-Hurd 1980).
89. Under the Illinois plan, 90% of the deposit was returned and the remaining
10% was retained by the court as the administration fee. This reform measure was up
held in Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 359 (1971), in which the Court stated:
Prior to 1964 the professional bail bondsmen system with all its abuses was
in full and odorous bloom in Illinois. Under that system the bail bondsman
customarily collected the maximum fee (10% of the amount of the bond) permit
ted by statute . . . and retained that entire amount even though the accused
fully satisfied the conditions of the bond.(Footnote omitted)
90. It also has the advantage of making the same funds available to pay for coun
sel, i.e., the amount posted with the clerk can be assigned to the attorney. This helps
relieve the public defender system. For example, assume a criminal charge with bond set
at $5,000; the accused would have to pay $500 to the clerk; of this, $50 would be retained
as the administrative fee and $450 would be returned to the accused. However, the ac
cused might have assigned this to a private attorney in order to obtain representation.
The net result is that more criminal defendants are able to afford to pay for their own
counsel, thus reducing the load of public defenders. See generally Minutes of the Indiana
Legislature'S Interim Study Committee on Bail Bonding, July 17, 1979 (testimony of Jim
Drogge), September 18, 1979 (testimony of Judge Richard Muroc).
91. Board of County Comm'rs v. Farris, 168 Ind. App. 309, 342 N.E.2d 642
(CLApp. 1976). Retention oflO% of the deposit by the clerk as an administrative fee was
also upheld by the appellate court.
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passage of a new bail act in Indiana. 92 While this act clarified the
courts' options in terms of the ten percent deposit system and the use
of non-monetary conditions93 and codified the factors to be taken
into account in setting bail or conditions,94 importantly it did not
mandate the use of the least restrictive alternative. Nor did it ad
dress the issue of who had the burden of establishing the need for
conditions other than release on the recognizance of the accused. 95
The primary advantage of the 1980 legislation in Indiana is that
it clearly gives courts the ability to implement bail reform measures
without questions of their legality. It is hoped that more court sys
tems will realize the state's only interest can be better served through
methods other than the monetary bail system at a substantial savings
to the community by reducing the number of pre-trial detainees
whose incarceration is so costly.96
As demonstrated above, the evidence in favor of reform, both in
terms of equity and in achieving the state's purpose is overwhelming.
Professor Foote has indicated that, as applied to indigent defendants,
the money bail requirement represents the "incredible failure of the
Supreme Court, courts in general and lawyers to do anything about
what has become the most pervasive denial of equal justice in the
entire criminal justice system. . . ."'97 Even absent reform, how
ever, the existing system would be more responsive to indigents if
they had effective counsel, who immediately upon arrest could peti
tion the court on their behalf, for bond reduction and/or release
without monetary conditions. Clearly, the evils of the monetary bail
system are exacerbated in situations where the accused is either with
out counselor provided with counsel who routinely ignore the op
portunity to seek a reduction of bail.
92. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-8-3(2) (West Supp. 1983-84).
93. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-8-3 (West Supp. 1983-84).
94. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-33-8-4 (West Supp. 1983-84).
95. It should be noted that this act was never intended as a "reform" measure in
the sense that it would make release more attainable for more people. Rather, it was
proposed by the Marion County prosecuting attorney as a revision "that would protect
the public and not encourage crime." Minutes of the Indiana Legislature's Interim Study
Committee on Bail Bonding, Aug. 16, 1979. More specifically, he advocated the provi
sions of IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-33-8-5 through 6 (West Supp. 1983-84)conceming revo
cation and detention for up to 15 days if charged with an offense while on parole or
probation. Id.
96. See supra note 65 regarding the cost of housing pretrial detainees.
97. Foote, Pretrial Detention: Bailor Jail?, Crime and Justice in America, ParI II ,
The Gainesville Sun, Nov. 21, 1977, at 8, col. e, quoted in Pugh v. Rainwater, 572 F.2d
1053, 1068 (5th Cir. 1978).
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THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL-THE PROBLEMS OF BOTH
INDIGENT DEFENDANTS AND ATTORNEYS WHEN
COUNSEL IS ApPOINTED BY THE COURT

The competent assistance of counsel, court-appointed if neces
sary, is now a clearly established constitutional right in any criminal
case where a sentence of imprisonment can be imposed. 98 Precisely
what is required of competent representation, however, is less clear.
Although the trend is toward a more demanding minimum standard
of professional representation,99 it is still difficult to obtain reversal
of a conviction based on incompetence of counsel. This reluctance
to overturn otherwise valid convictions can be explained, at least in
part, by the need to show that counsel's shortcoming affected the
outcome. iOO Reversal of a conviction might also be viewed as too
drastic a remedy. In view of the absence of an effective remedy at
the appellate level, it is even more critical that trial courts assure
effective assistance of counsel in the first instance.
Inadequacy of representation is more likely to be raised when
the accused has been represented by appointed counsel,lOi than
when the accused has retained counsel of his choice. \02 This is true
98. Since its landmark decision in 1932 in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932),
requiring counsel in capital cases, the Supreme Court has recognized that the sixth
amendment right to counsel is incorporated through the due process clause of the four
teenth amendment and therefore applicable to the states. This case also established that
the assistance of counsel must be "effective and substantial." Id. at 53. Subsequently in
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341-45 (1963), the Court extc:!nded Powell and held
that the states must provide attorneys for indigent defendants in all felony cases. Finally,
in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972), the Court held that defendants could
not be imprisoned in misdemeanor cases unless represented by counsel. See also Scott v.
lllinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
99. An earlier standard, known as the "mockery of justice" test, was based on the
due process clause. The representation would be found ineffective only when the defense
counsel's efforts had been so perfunctory or outrageous as to render the entire trial such a
farce, mockery, travesty or sham that it shocked the conscience of the reviewing court.
See, e.g., United States v. Dilella, 354 F.2d 584 (7th Cir. 1965). More recently several
courts have abandoned the "mockery ofjustice" test and have held that the sixth amend
ment "guarantees a criminal defendant legal assistance which meets a minimum stan
dard of professional representation." See, e.g., United States ex reI. Williams v.
Twomey, 510 F.2d 634, 640-41 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 876 (1975). See generally
Note, Effective Assistance of Counsel' A Constitutional Right in Transition, 10 VAL.
U.L.REV. 509 (1976).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en bane);
Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978) (en bane), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974
(1979).
101. Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69 GEO. L.J. 1015,1039
(1981).
102. While an indigent is clearly entitled to court-appointed counsel, this does not
include the right to select a particular attorney. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 604
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for a number of reasons, including delays in appointment of counsel
for indigents, overly burdensome caseloads of public defenders, and
the inability of an incarcerated client to go to the attorney's office
and actively participate in his defense. Direct employment of the
appointed attorney by the court can lead to less than complete alle
giance to the indigent client. These problems exist where the attor
neys are full-time defenders, but they are magnified when the
defenders are part-time because of the inevitable tension between
public defender responsibilities and the demands of a private
practice.
Another explanation for more claims of inadequacy when rep
resented by appointed counsel might be clients' unfavorable percep
tion of their attorney. A recent study comparing the predispositions
of clients toward private defense counsel and public defenders lO3 re
vealed that defendants have "strikingly different images" of private
counsel and defenders. 104 Whether the clients' perceptions are cor
rect is unimportant because the existence of the perception will nor
mally lead to an unsatisfatory attorney-client relationship;
dissatisfaction with the relationship often leads to claims of incom
petency, whether or not the service provided was adequate. lOS PubF.2d 474,478 (7th Cir. 1979); Harling v. United States, 387 A.2d 1101, 1105 (D.C. 1978);
State v. Irvin, 259 Ind. 610, 615, 291 N.E.2d 70,74 (1973). Nor does it include the right to
a "meaningful relationship" between the accused and the attorney. Morris v. Siappy, 103
S. Ct. 1610, 1617 (1983)(quoting Siappy v. Morris, 649 F.2d 718, 720 (9th Cir. 1981».
103. Casper,lmproving Defender-Client Relations, 34 NLADA BRIEFCASE 114, No.
4 (Aug. 1977). See also, Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Allomey and Client, 69 GEO.
L.l. lOIS, 1020-21, 1035-45 (1981). It is important to keep in mind the fact that many, if
not most, public defender clients are detained prior to trial. Some courts have a practice
of refusing to appoint counsel to any defendant who can make bail, but the Indiana
Supreme Court has recently ruled that "the fact that the defendant was able to post a
bond is not determinative of his non-indigency but is only a factor to be considered."
Moore v. State, 401 N.E.2d 676, 679 (Ind. 1980).
104. First, there are relatively lar&e and consistent differences in perceptions
of retained counsel and defenders, With larger numbers of defendants endorsing
favorable views of private lawyers. What is important is not whether defendant
perce.ptions are correct - and there is a good deal of evidence that their views
of pnvate lawyers miss the hasty and often exploitive character of many crimi
nal practices - but that substantial numbers of defendants bring to their en
counters with defenders, doubts about their potential lawyers'
commitment. . . .
To put the matter crudely, it appears that most defendants do not believe that
public defenders want to sell ilierr clients out - indeed large numbers have the
opposite belief - but that many are skeptical about the extent to which defend
ers really are inclined to fight hard to achieve their clients' goals. Although they
may be incorrect, relativeTy few entertain such doubts about private lawyers.
Casper, supra note 103, at 116.
105. In other words, "public relations" is an important part of practicing law and
the appointed counsel who is "forced" upon a client goes into the relationship having to
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lic defenders who are in fact doing a competent job for their clients
end up with disgruntled clients simply because of the general jail
house perception of defenders.
This raises several questions: first, whether it is merely a prob
lem of perception or do defender-clients really suffer from poor
quality representation; and second, whether the problem is merely
perceived or real, can anything be done to alleviate it? These ques
tions are important because of the vital role played by counsel in the
criminal justice system. The advantage of having an advocate famil
iar with the legal system is tremendous, particularly when an ac
cused is incarcerated prior to trial without any meaningful access to
the procedural safeguards that can be readily invoked by an
attorney. 106
There is evidence in at least one Indiana county that the jail
house perception of the defender system is accurate. The method of
providing appointed counsel in this county is by no means unique.
In Indiana the means of providing court-appointed counsel is left
almost entirely to the discretion of the trial courts. \07 The trial
courts determine indigency\08 and most appoint attorneys who are
part-time employees of the court as "pauper counsel." Under such
an arrangement one or more attorneys, depending on the number of
criminal cases in the county, are employed on a part-time basis on
overcome an adverse mind-set. This is consistent with general American philosophy that
you "get what you pay for."
The extent to which defendants choose the financial transaction as the reason
for the better performance of private attorneys suggest that what most attracts
defendants to private attorneys is the notion that, because of the financial ex
change between lawyer and client, the lawyer will be more committed to the
defendant's interests. It is the money that provides a sense of control, the lever
age to insure that lawyers will listen to their client, take instructions from them,
and generally exert themselves on their behalf. Public defenders, however, are
not only paid by someone other than the client, but that "someone other" is
"the state" - the very institution that is proceeding against the defendant.
Thus, public defenders suffer not only from the fact that they are imposed upon
the defendant rather than being selected, and from the absence of financial ex
change, but from the idea that they are employed by "the enemy."
Casper, supra note 103, at 126. To the extent that money is the key, Casper suggests that
public defender clients are simply being "good Americans." Id.
106. These safeguards include a prompt appearance before a judicial officer, a re
lease unless there is probable cause for a criminal charge, an individualized bail determi
nation, the right to refuse making statements, discovery and a pretrial investigation.
107. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 33-9-10-1 (West 1983). It provides that "[t)he
judges of any court having criminal jurisdiction,. . . shall have the power to contract. . .
to provide legal counsel for... poor persons. . . ." Id.
108. Moore v. State, 401 N.E.2d 676,678 (Ind. 1980).
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the court budget and are expected to handle all "pauper" cases. 109
Generally, these attorneys also maintain a private practice in the
community.
The "system" described above existed in Lake County, Indiana
in 1974 when the adequacy of court-appointed counsel was chal
lenged in Hoe v. County ofLake. 110 In this case, the plaintiffs raised
several issues, including the general lack of resources made available
for the representation of indigents and the inherent conflict, or lack
of independence, resulting from the fact that the court-appointed at
torneys were employees of the court. II I The complaint did not at
tack the competence of any particular attorney, but rather
challenged the system within which they operated.
As part of the presentation to the federal court in Hoe, a study
of the system was prepared. 112 This study, based on a sample of
1,730 casesll3 from the Criminal Division of Indiana's Lake County
Superior Court, sought to measure objectively, and make compari
sons between, the performance of retained and appointed counsel.
Because all of the defenders were employed by the court on a part
time basis and several maintained a private criminal practice, the
Lake County system provided a unique opportunity to compare the
109. Criminal Courts Technical Assistance Project, The Structure and Funding for
Criminal Defense of Indigents in Indiana 16-25 (1974) (unpublished report); Kittel, lJe
fense ofthe Poor: A Study in Public Parsimony and Private Poverty, 45 IND. L.J. 90, 91-95
(1969). While court-appointed attorneys were generally referred to as "pauper counsel"
in the Lake County system, we will hereinafter refer to them as "public defenders".
110. 468 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Ind. 1978), affd, 601 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1979).
111. According to the evidence in Noe, the chief judge of the criminal division of
the Lake County Superior Court personally hired the public defenders as well as their
support staff. In addition, he occasionally attended staff meetings of the defenders and
could discharge any defender or staff member at will. All the public defenders were
employed on a part-time basis, and most were also engaged in private law practices
which often included the representation of criminal defendants in the same court.
In 1972, the year before the case was filed, only two part-time defenders had the
responsibility for representing all indigents charged with felonies in Lake County. Two
additional part-time defenders were added in 1973, and the budget has steadily increased
so that by 1977, $242,130 was allocated solely for the salaries of 13 part-time defenders,
two investigators, and two secretaries.
The determination of an accused's eligibility for representation by a public defender
was not made until the first court appearance and normally several days elapsed between
the date of arrest and this initial appearance by the defendant. Assuming the accused
was found eligible, the judge then appointed the defender staff as an entirety, and a
specific attorney would not begin representation until designated by the chief defender.
Thus, indigents would not know who would ultimately be representing them until after
arraignment. See generally Pretrial Order, Noe (filed Feb. 2, 1977).
112. See infra Appendix B.
113. These cases were filed in 1975-76 and disposed of by July 31, 1977. See infra
Appendix B at 323.
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performance of an attorney acting in a private capacity with that of
the same attorney serving as appointed counsel. l14 This comparison
would suggest that any difference between appointed and private
counsel could be ascribed not to general incompetence or lack of
ability on the part of appointed counsel, but to the "system." Impor
tant conclusions can be drawn from this study which reflect the
problems of indigents represented by court-appointed counsel in a
system such as that which existed in Lake County.
The study showed there was a significant delay between the date
of arrest and the appointment of a public defender. The average
length of delay was twelve days and, in one-fourth of the cases, the
defender was not appointed until at least fourteen days after ar
resLllS This reflects only the delay in appointment and not the addi
tional delay between appointment and actual contact between
attorney and client. The accused indigent is thus going through a
critical point in the process without the benefit of counsel. I 16
The study compares the results in cases in which the defendants
114. Of the 19 attorneys who were employed as part-time defenders during the
period studied, 14 also handled criminal cases in the same court in a private capacity.
Twenty percent or 188 of the 920 cases handled by private attorneys were handled by
defenders acting in their private capacity. See infra Appendix B at 323-24.
115. See id. The Mudd study showed a similar delay in appointment of counsel in
the Allen County Circuit Court. See Brief of Appellants A-86 app. filed in Mudd.
116. The early stages are critical for several reasons. Waivers of fundamental con
stitutional rights, e.g., self-incrimination and consent to searches and seizures, occur most
frequently during the pre-arraignment stage. Factual development is most effective at
the earliest possible date. A good example is the need to obtain experts before perishable
or transitory evidence is lost. In addition, particularly in situations where the prosecutor
makes the determination of whether and what to charge, defense counsel can do the most
effective plea bargaining very early and may even affect the charge that is filed. Finally,
if counsel enters the case at the "focus of suspicion stage," he or she will be better pre
pared at the initial court appearances.
For these reasons, the standards of the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association (11-2), the National Study Commission on Defense Services (1.2),
all call for representation at the point at which the person comes under, or
appears to come under, the focus of suspicion of crime. Representation that
first attaches at the initial hearing may be too late to protect vital constitutional
rights that the defendant has waived. A defense counsel who enters the case at
a still later point may find that his ability to render effective assistance to his
client may have been totally negated by the very time at which appointment
was made.
Affidavit of Laurence A. Benner (September 29, 1977); Mr. Benner, through his affidavit,
testified as an expert witness in the Hoe case. At that time he was National Director of
Defense Services for the National Legal Aid and Defender Association and had exten
sive experience in criminal justice, both as defense counsel and through studies of de
fense services. See also COURTS, Standard 13.1 commentary 254 (National Advisory
Comm. on Crim.Justice Standards and Goals 1973).
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were represented by public defenders with those in private counsel
cases and, where the information was available, results when defend-.
ers acted in their private capacity. Three aspects of representation
were examined: (1) motions to reduce bail,(2) motions for change of
venue from the judge, and (3) case outcome. 1I7 Not surprisingly,
criminal defendants with appointed counsel were far more likely to
be detained prior to trial than those represented by private counsel
(70% vs. 22%).118 With a significantly higher percentage of clients
incarcerated prior to trial, one would expect appointed counsel to file
more motions to reduce bail. Yet, just the opposite was true. Reduc
tion motions were filed by appointed counsel in only 19% of their
cases while private counsel filed such motions in 42% of their
cases. 1I9 Not only did appointed counsel file fewer motions to re
duce bond, when such motions were filed there was an average lapse
of thirty-eight days between arrest and filing of the motion in ap
pointed counsel cases compared to only eighteen days in private
counsel cases. 120 Private attorneys were successful in 88% of the re
duction motions while appointed counsel succeeded in 75%.121
Where such motion was successful, in 97% of the cases handled by
private counsel the defendant obtained release while 88% of the cli
ents of appointed counsel actually obtained their release after a suc
cessful bond reduction motion. 122
117. See infra Appendix B at 324. These factors were chosen because they are both
objective and important to the accused. For example, it was generally believed that two
of the four judges in the criminal division were harsher in sentencing and, therefore,
private counsel rarely tried their cases before them. A reduction in bail might mean the
difference between pretrial freedom and continued detention.
118. See infra Appendix B at 325.
119. Id
120. Id. In part, this difference might be explained by the delay in appointment of
a public defender.
121. Id. With a success rate of 75%, one might expect that reduction motions
would be routinely filed in nearly every case. Yet appointed counsel did so in only 19%
of their cases.
122. See Brief of Appellants, A-I87 app., filed in Noe. Before simply assuming
that these figures suggest public defenders are less competent, we must consider some
other possibilities. First, even though ability to post bond and eligibility for appointed
counsel cannot be equated, Moore v. State, 401 N.E.2d 676, 679 (Ind. 1980), it can gener
ally be assumed that the clients of appointed counsel are more indigent and thus less
likely to benefit from a reduction in bail. Second, those who are "more indigent" are less
likely to have the community ties which would argue a favor of bond reduction or release
without monetary bond. Thus, resources play a role, although less direct, even when
ability to pay is not the sole factor considered. Third, the perception of some judges
might be that an accused who is paying for counsel is, at least in part, already paying the
price of being brought into the criminal justice system. None of these, however, would
explain why fewer reduction motions are filed by appointed counsel.
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Perhaps even more significant is the defenders' practice with re
spect to motions for change of venue from the judge. In the cases
studied, 199 such motions were filed and 63% of them were directed
at one of the four full-time criminal division judges. 123 The study·
showed that this judge imposed a prison sentence in a significantly
higher percentage of the cases in which there was a conviction, 124
and the number of venue motions directed at this judge suggests at
torneys were well aware of this fact. Since, at the time of the study,
Indiana law required that a motion for change of venue125 had to be
granted, it represents an important right of the accused. Signifi
cantly, appointed attorneys filed only seventeen (8%) of these mo
tions (in 2% of their 737 cases) whereas private counsel filed 182
(92%) motions (in 20% of their 909 cases}.126 Not surprisingly, then,
indigents' cases were far more likely to be heard by this judge than
the cases of defendants with private counsel.
This disparity is even more striking when the performance of
appointed counsel is compared to their conduct when acting as pri
vate counsel. While they filed venue motions in only 2% of their
appointed cases, these same attorneys filed venue motions in 26% of
their private cases. 127 This demonstrates that these attorneys recog
nize the importance of getting the "right" judge. Also, it suggests that
despite their own judgment, attorneys, when acting in their capacity
as defenders employed by the court, were reluctant to follow a prac
tice which could result in one of the four judges, their employers,
having few, if any, cases. 128
Significant disparities in case outcome were also present. Of the
cases which went to trial, 70% of the clients of appointed counsel
were convicted whereas only 49% of the clients of private counsel
123. See infra Appendix B at 326.
124. Id.
125. IND. CRIM. R. 12; for a discussion of Rule 12 see Benjamin v. Criminal Court,
264 Ind. 191,341 N.E.2d 495 (1976); Spugnardi v. State, 171 Ind. App. 272, 356 N.E.2d
1199 (1976). Rule 12 was amended, effective July I, 1981, and there is no longer a right
to a change of venue.
126. See infra Appendix B at 327.
127. Id.
128. It should be noted that the initial assignments of cases to particular judges do
not explain the disparity discussed here. See Appendix to Brief of Appellants, A-188 to 
189 app., filed in Seventh Circuit in Noe. The potential influence of the employment
relationship has been noticed by others. Burt, Conflict and Trust Between Attorney and
Client, 69 GEO. L.J. 1015, 1036-37 (1981); J. CASPER, AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 105
(1972); A. BLUMBERG, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 66 (1967).
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were convicted. 129 The overall conviction rate, whether by plea of
guilty or by conviction following trial, was 67% for clients of ap
pointed counsel and 58% for clients of private counsel. Because most
clients with appointed counsel are incarcerated prior to trial, the evi
dence in Mudd suggests that the disparity is explained in part by
detention. 130 Nevertheless, even when the clients of appointed coun
sel were not detained prior to trial, these case outcome statistics re
main approximately the same.131
Not only are the clients of appointed counsel convicted more
often than those represented by private counsel, they are also given
prison sentences twice as often. Clients of appointed counsel re
ceived a prison sentence in 49% of the cases while the clients of pri
vate counsel in only 23% of the cases. In contrast, clients of
defenders acting in a private capacity received a prison term in only
22% of the cases. ll2 Examining only the cases in which the accused
was convicted, 73% of the clients represented by appointed counsel
received a prison term compared to only 40% of those represented by
private counsel. While some of this disparity can be explained by
pre-trial detention, it is significant that among those released-where
pre-trial detention played no role~efender clients fared worse than
clients with retained counsel; that is, defender clients were sentenced
to prison more often. \33
What can be concluded from these statistics? A fair inference is
that a public defender system, structured like that in Lake County,
Indiana, provides less effective representation to indigents than pri
vate counsel. Notably, the problems stem from the system rather
than the individual attorneys because the same attorneys who served
as public defenders achieved results and performed similar to or bet
ter than other private counsel when they were retained by their
clients.
Can anything be done to improve this situation? Regarding de
fender-client relations or clients' perceptions of defenders, there are
several possibilities. Because the unfavorable perceptions are not
contrary to the evidence, fewer convictions and less harsh sentences
due to attorney efforts would produce higher levels of client satisfac
129. See infra Appendix B at 328. Fifty-nine percent of the clients of public de
fenders acting in a private capacity were convicted. Id.
130. See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
131. See infra Appendix B at 329.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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tion. 134 In addition, it has been suggested that a non-adversary dis
position, a plea of guilty, for example, is likely to produce a less
favorable evaluation because it reduces substantially "the occasions
upon which a client can observe his attorney fighting on his be
half."135 This does not mean that plea bargaining should be aban
doned when it is advantageous. It does indicate that a reputation of
bargaining all cases can be disastrous. Discussing the reasons for
strategy decisions can be beneficial, "both so the client can make a
considered choice and be given a chance to reflect upon the fact that
waiving a hearing or 'copping a plea' is in his interest and not simply
the product of laziness- or indifference on the part of his attorney."136
Defenders can generally improve their relations with clients by in
volving them in the defense and spending more time with their cli
ents.137 Clearly there are some things which public defenders can do
to enhance their reputations among their clients and, consequently,
improve client satisfaction.
The "system" can also make a satisfactory appointed counsel!
client relationship more possible by further distancing the appointed
attorneys from their employer, the court. The issue of professional
independence is addressed in the ABA's "Standards Relating to Pro
viding Defense Services":
The plan should be designed to guarantee the integrity of the
relationship between lawyer and client. The plan and the lawyers
serving it should be free from political influence and should be
134. Casper, supra note 103, at 130.
135. Id.
136. Id.
Moreover, to the extent that the defendant can participate in or be made
aware of the degree to which the attorney actually argues on his behalf even in
the bargaining context - for example, the possibility of permitting the client to
be present at bargaining sessions, or short of this, simply giving the client a
clear and detailed account of what occurred - the arguments presented here
suggest that there may be a possibility for increasing the client's confidence that
the attorney has done a satisfactory job.
Id.

137.
[f)he data suggests that such time does have a payoff in terms of client
satisfaction. The data also suggests that this payoff revolves largely around the
effective dimension of the client evaluation, not around obtaining more
favorable outcomes. If we define an adequate legal defense strictly in terms of
obtaining the most favorable outcome possible for the client, it might be argued
that time spent with clients is not important. But if we enlarge tlie concept of
what is an adequate legal defense to encompass providing the client not only
"justice" .in terms of outcome but also providing him a sense that he has had
adequate legal representation, then time spent with the client does appear to
make a difference.
Id. at 130-31.
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subject to judicial supervision only in the same manner and to the
same extent as are the lawyers in private practice. One means for
assuring this independence, regardless of the type of system
adopted, is to place the ultimate authority and responsibility for
the operation of the plan in a board of trustees. 138

An expert's reflection on the Lake County system is informative.
The direct employment of part-time public defenders by the
chief judge of the criminal division...places those public defend
ers in a conflict of interest having constitutional magni
tude. . . .[T)his employment relationship jeopardizes the duty of
defense counsel to fulfill their role as active and independent ad
vocates. Indeed, this relationship creates the appearance of im
propriety while presenting multifarious possibilities for subverting
the adversary system. The loyalties of defense attorneys should lie
solely with their clients, and regardless of the integrity of individ
ual public defenders, the system for employing public defenders in
the criminal division of the Lake Superior Court violates this pre
cept. [In such a system] public defenders are placed in the di
lemma of serving both their clients and the judge, and the result is
apt to be less than the vigorous advocacy the accused have a right
to expect. Moreover, clients may understandably view public de
fenders with suspicion and distrust insofar as they are aware of the
employment relationship with the chief judge, and this is not con
ducive to building attitudes of cooperation with counsel and re
spect for the criminal justice system. 139

These observations are certainly consistent with findings of the
study, particularly the reluctance of the defenders to change venue.
The relationship between the independence of the defenders
and the outcome of cases was demonstrated by a study comparing
two cities which utilize independent defender offices with a third city
where the court assigned private attorneys to represent indigents. l40
In New York and Los Angeles, indigents represented by the in
dependent defender offices obtained outcomes equivalent to those of
defendants who retained private counsel. In Washington, D.C., in
digents with counsel appointed by the court fared worse than de
138. STANDARDS RELATING TO PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES § 1.4 (Approved
Draft 1968).
139. Affidavit of John E. Ackermann (Oct. 6, 1977); through the affidavit, Mr. Ack
ermann testified as an expert witness in the Noe case. At that time he was Dean of the
National College of Criminal Defense Lawyers and Public Defenders at the Bates Col
lege of Law, University of Houston.
140. HERMAN, SINGLE, BOSTON, COUNSEL FOR THE POOR 5 (1977).
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fendants with retained counsel. 141 While both the conflict-of-interest
theory and its argument that it reaches a constitutional dimension
were rejected by the court in Noe, it is certainly a factor to be consid
ered in establishing a public defender system. 142
Although any improvements in the indigent clients' perceptions
of their appointed counsel would obviously be of great benefit, the
question remains whether case outcomes can ever be equalized or
whether the difference in outcome is an inherent obstacle when fac
ing the system without the resources to fully exploit the safegaurds
provided. Even if some disadvantages are inherent, they are not the
sole factors causing the difference in outcome. The three aspects of
the system discussed in this article are related and intertwined. De
lays between arrest and initial court appearance can forever
prejudice the indigent accused; pre-trial detention makes conviction
and a prison term much more likely; those who suffer a delay be
tween arrest and court appearance and those detained prior to trial
are most likely to be represented by appointed counsel. Could things
be equalized if independent defenders, appointed shortly after arrest,
and had sufficient resources to fully prepare the case? Would release
prior to trial serve as an equalizer in that it would enhance the attor
ney/ client relationship and give the accused an opportunity to de
velop a favorable record on the outside while awaiting trial? Or, are
indigent persons in our society simply more convictable and more
imprisonable? Even assuming an affirmative, there are possiblities
for reform which would minimize the discrepancies. Some of these
are explored in the following section.
V.

"LEGALIZING" THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM -

WHO CAN

MAKE THE REQUIRED CHANGES?

The budget cuts implemented by the Reagan administration
make it apparent that few, if any, federal dollars will be available to
local communities in the near future for the purpose of revamping
their criminal justice systems. While the constitutional rights of per
141.

142.

/d. at 153-66.

Judge Sharp, in Noe, concluded:
In view of the impartial and neutral role played by the judge, it is difficult
to imagine how the employment of pauper attorneys by the Court could be
considered an "inherently compromising" situation. In any event, it is not a
situation which case law holds to be constitutionally defective.
468 F. Supp. at 53. But if. , People v. Barboza, 29 Cal. 3d 375,381,627 P.2d 188, 191, 173
Cal. Rptr. 458, 461 (1981) (held that contracts between courts and public defenders
presented inherent and irreconcilable conflicts of interests).
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sons accused of a crime cannot be made contigent on the availability
of funds, as a practical matter, cost does playa major role in deci
sions relating to the functioning of public institutions. The criminal
justice system is no exception. Fortunately, the reforms needed in
most Indiana counties, for example, would not cause a substantial
drain on public funds. In fact, reforms would probably result in a
substantial savings to the local communities. 143 This is not, of
course, intended to suggest that the needed reform should take place
only if it is financially feasible or that financial savings should be the
primary motive for reform. Because constitutional rights are at
stake, the suggested reforms must take place. The fact that the re
forms may actually result in substantial savings should simply pro
vide an additional incentive to budget-conscious public officials.
The purpose of this section is not to attempt to assess blame or
fault for any shortcomings in our present criminal justice system. In
stead, it represents a plea to public officials to scrutinize closely the
system as it currently operates in their area and assess its strengths
and weaknesses in light of what has been said in the preceding sec
tions. If defects are identified, it is mandatory that corrective steps
be taken.
The most obvious vehicle for any of the suggested changes is the
state legislature. For example, legislation mandating (1) an appear
ance before a judicial officer promptly upon arrest in all cases; (2)
the use of the least restrictive alternative for release pending trial;
and (3) the prompt appointment of counsel for indigents, would help
alleviate the problems. Such legislation would help fulfill the legis
lature's obligations to keep state laws in conformity with constitu
tional requirements and to safeguard the public treasury. Even if
such legislation were passed, the responsibility for implementation
would fall upon local officials. Absent a local commitment to com
ply with the law, state statutes would simply represent a hollow·
promise. Therefore, it is necessary to look primarily to local officials.
Even without legislative change, all of the necessary changes
can be made on the local level. As none of the shortcomings in the
current system are mandated by statute, local officials are not pre
143. For example, substantial savings would result from a reduction in the cost of
housing inmates if more people were brought before a judicial official immediately upon
arrest and released prior to trial. There would be less need for public defenders if people
were released pending trial and employed (in public work programs if nothing else is
available). The need for public defender services would be further diminished if funds
used to pay bail could also be used to pay for an attorney and if there were fewer appeals
challenging the competency of appointed counsel.
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vented from making the needed changes. Since they, too, have an
obligation to protect the rights of citizens, it is suggested that local
officials must make the changes required by the Constitution and
laws. Unquestionably, the courts must bear the primary responsibil
ity for legalizing the criminal justice system.
Several things could be done by local judges to protect the rights
of indigents charged with a criminal offense. First, an order could be
directed to the police officials responsible for operating the jails re
quiring them to bring all detained persons before the court within a
set time of their arrest, normally twenty-four hours. This could be
easily facilitated by having one court in each county available, at a
certain time each day, to consider such cases. Both the police and
the prosecutor would be forced to demonstrate probable cause in
cases in which an arrest was made without a warrant-a minimal
burden since no lawful arrest can be made without probable cause.
Second, at this initial appearance the court could determine whether
or not appointed counsel was necessary,l44 thereby facilitating com
petent representation. 145 At the same time it could consider release
and require the state, through the prosecuting attorney, to make a
showing of the necessity for conditions on the pre-trial release of the
individuals detained.
Third, regarding appointed counsel, state law l46 places the bur
den on the local courts to make appointed counsel available. Noth
ing would prevent the local courts from contracting with an
independent agency to provide such services. 147 The only role of the
court then would be to determine whether the accused was indigent
and, if so, the agency would be appointed to provide representation.
The contractual agreement would assure the independence of the
agency and include as part of its terms minimum standards relating
to the defense function.l 48 Fourth, the courts could establish pro
grams designed to divert people from incarceration, both prior to
trial and after conviction. 149
Other local officials also have an obvious role to play in initiat
ing and implementing changes in the system. Prosecutors, who have
144. As indicated, this is required in Indiana by Nacotfv. State, 256 Ind. 97,102,
267 N.E.2d 165,168 (1971).
145. See supra notes liS, 116.
146. Moore v. State, 401 N.E.2d 676, 678 (Ind. 1980).
147. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 33-9-10-1 (West 1983), quoted supra note 107.
148. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The Defense Function (Approved
Draft 1968).
149. See, e.g., NAT'L DISTRICT ArrORNEY'S ASS'N, A PROSECUTOR'S MANUAL ON
SCREENING AND DIVERSIONARY PROGRAMS (1972).
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an obligation to uphold the Constitution, must take steps to assure
that the local procedures do not systematically infringe upon the
rights of the accused. While they have an obvious interest in elimi
nating any defects that can result in the reversal of otherwise valid
convictions,lso their obligation goes beyond that. lsi At a minimum,
prosecuting attorneys should be expected to cooperate with the court
by being available for the early appearances before a judicial officer
for determining probable cause, the need for conditions upon release
and the appointment of counsel.
The police responsible for pre-trial detention have a definite
monetary interest in preventing delays between arrest and initial
court appearance. This is true at least in part, because they are sub
ject to false imprisonment actions, possibly resulting in damages
which may be assessed against either the individual police or the
general budget of the department. IS2 They are also fully aware of
150. It has been held lhat defects in pretrial detention are not grounds for reversal
of lhe conviction unless lhey result in improper confessions. Williams v. State, 264 Ind.
664,678,348 N.E.2d 623, 632 (1976). Similarly, bail decisions are mooted upon convic
tion and not a basis for challenging the conviction. Holguin v. State, 256 Ind. 371, 374,
269 N.E.2d 159,160-61 (1971); Bozovichar v. State, 230 Ind. 358, 363, 103 N.E.2d 680,682
(1952). Competency of counsel can be a factor on appeal of a conviction; however, as
indicated earlier, it is difficult to obtain a reversal based on incompetency. See supra
notes 99-100.
151.
It is an important function of the prosecutor to seek to reform and im
prove the administration of criminal justice. When inadequacies or injustices in
the substantive or procedural law come to the prosecutor's attention, he or she
should stimulate efforts for remedial action.
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standard 3-1.4 (1980). The commentary to this
standard is even more specific.
As lhe public official in constant contact wilh the day-to-day administra
tion of criminal justice, lhe prosecutor occupies a unique position to influence
lhe improvement of the law. As one national study has noted, lhe prosecutor
"affects lhe development of legal rules by his arguments in court. He can help
bring about needed reform by pressing for changes in bail practices, for exam
ple, or in procedures for the appointment of counsel." (footnote omitted). . . .
It is in lhe public interest for the prosecutor to foster good working relationships
with lhe defense bar, including defender agencies, and to participate in such
activities as criminal law sections of lhe organized bar and joint seminars on
criminal law and procedure. Reforms and improvements in lhe criminal law
will more readily gain lhe approval of legislative bodies and lhe public if they
are the joint work product of both prosecutors and defense lawyers.
Id. See also, Standard 3-1.I(c). (''The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely
to convict.")
152. Individual as well as governmental liability is contemplated by Indiana stat
utes. See IND. CODE ANN. §§34-4-16.5-5, 34-4-16.7-1 (West 1983). Under recent
Supreme Court decisions, local governmental entities can be liable for the actions of their
employees and agents in civil rights cases filed under 42 U.S.c. § 1983 (1976). See Mo
nell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Owen v. City of Independence, 445
U.S. 622 (1980).
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the cost of pre-trial detention and should be expected to look for
ways to reduce this cost through the release of inmates whenever
possible.
Finally, the public defenders appointed to represent indigent
persons certainly have an ethical obligation to enforce all pre-trial
rights of their clients. Their ability to protect these rights is en
hanced significantly by an appointment promptly after arrest so they
can insist upon an early court appearance for the accused and the
appropriate individualized inquiry relating to pre-trial release. Re
garding the effectiveness of appointed counsel, the individual attor
neys have both an ethical obligation to provide competent
representation and a financial interest in avoiding malpractice. ls3
The potential agents for change on the local level are severa1. It
is suggested that they, individually and collectively, have an obliga
tion both to the community they represent and the persons charged
with a crime to assure that the criminal justice system operates in a
manner which protects the constitutional and statutory rights of all
persons who come into contact with the system. Fair, equal treat
ment cannot be contingent upon ability to pay. No responsible local
official associated with the criminal justice system should tolerate
practices or policies that in any way reduce the opportunity of an
indigent person to obtain treatment comparable to that afforded to
those with resources. A criminal justice system is acceptable only if
it guarantees complete protection of the rights of those least able to
protect themselves.
VI.

CONCLUSION

It is not clear whether the availability of financial resources can
ever be eliminated as an outcome determinative factor in the crimi
nal justice system. What is clear, however, is that most communities
in Indiana have not taken all reasonable steps to minimize the im
pact and significance of the wide disparity in the resources available
to criminal defendants. Until this is done, it is impossible to deter
mine whether the difference - between those with and those with
out resources - is inherent in the system.
153. The Supreme Court recently held that a public defender is not subject to lia
bility in suits by former clients under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) because "a public de
fender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional
functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding." Polk County v. Dodson,
454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). This, of course, does not eliminate "liability for malpractice in
an appropriate case under state tort law." Id See also, Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193,
201 (1979).
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It is difficult to take issue with anyone who argues in favor of
fairness and equity in the administration of our criminal justice sys
tem. Inequities, whether real or perceived, can only detract from its
credibility and legitimacy. Without these qualities the system is un
dermined and generally ineffective. Nevertheless, pleas for fairness
and equity often become controversial because they are blindly in
terpreted as demands for more procedural protections for
"criminals" that will further handicap law enforcement officials.
We are not advocating more or fewer procedural safeguards;
rather we are suggesting that those safeguards which do exist must
be enforced and made equally available to everyone charged with a
crime, regardless of wealth. Our Constitution and any minimal
sense ofjustice can tolerate nothing less. The demonstrated discrep
ancies between rules of law and local practices are intolerable. Such
"official lawlessness" is always most devastating to those with the
least power and influence - the poor.
The irony of the situation is that very significant improvements
in our system could be made with a minimal cost to society in terms
of either dollars or protection. In fact, as shown, some of the needed
changes would decrease cost and increase protection. Where there is
a need for greater protection, it should be provided through laws and
rules equally applicable to all. For example, if society is concerned
about the number of crimes committed by persons released pending
trial, this should be confronted by making the propensity to commit
another crime a ground for denying release, not by increasing bail so
only those with resources get released. Of course, there are many
arguments opposing preventive detention. Those with money do not
want freedom removed from the list of things that can be purchased.
Those without money are concerned with the potential for discrimi
natory application of preventive detention. The point is simply that
responsible officials must address the merits of preventive detention
as applied equally to all rather than imposing it upon some solely
because of their lack of resources .
. While, in the eyes of many, procedural protections are nothing
more than devices for "coddling criminals," it is unlikely that any
one would reject those protections if confronted with criminal prose
cution. The presumption of innocence, pre-trial release, the right to
counsel, checks on police practices, and other similar protections are
extremely important and serve a critical function in our adversary
system of justice. We ask only that those responsible for the opera
tion of our system take the time to determine whether these protec
tions are enforced and equally available to all.
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APPENDIXA
Mudd v. Busse: Study of the Effects of Pretrial
Detention in Allen County, Indiana

This study of pretrial detention in the Allen Circuit Court was
undertaken to test the frequently expressed observation that accused
persons detained during the pendency of their criminal proceedings
are convicted more often, and, once convicted, are sentenced to
prison more often than those released prior to disposition. l
The sample population selected for study consists of 441 felony
cases2 taken from the criminal causes which were filed in the Allen
Circuit Court during 1974 and 1975 in which a final disposition was
reached before November 22, 1976.3 The vast majority of the de
fendants studied (96%) were charged with only one crime, and the
most serious crimes charged were broken down as follows:
Type of Crime Charged
Crime
Armed Robbery
First Degree Burglary
Forgery and Uttering
Second Degree Burglary
Theft
Other

No.4

49
51
40

115
95
91
441

%

11
12
9
26
22
21
101%5

1. The study was done under the direction of Dr. Eric W. Single, a senior research
scientist with the Alcoholism and Drug Addiction Research Foundation in Toronto, Ca
nada. Dr. Single has supervised and conducted many similar studies. See e.g. , Counsel
for the Poor: Lawyer & Clients in Urban Criminal Courts (Lexington Press, 1977); The
Unconstitutional Administration ofBail, 8 CRlM. L. BULL. 459 (1972).
2. The term "case" is used to indicate a single criminal defendant. Thus, one crim
inal cause may consist of several defendants or "cases."
3. There were 510 cases filed in 1974 and 1975 which were disposed of by Novem
ber 22, 1976. Of these, 69 (13.5%) were excluded from the study for the following rea
sons: (a) all murder cases (16) and all cases in which the defendant was charged with
either extradition (4) or being a fugitive (23); (b) all cases (11) which were venued in or
out of the Circuit Court; (c) all cases (9) in which the court docket sheet could not be
located; and (d) all cases (6) which were dismissed before the defendant ever made a
court appearance. These cases were excluded primarily because bail was not set or be
cause they would not accurately reflect the typical process of criminal justice in the Allen
Circuit Court. Pending cases were not considered because they were missing one of the
important elements of the study, i.e., case outcome.
4. Refers to the number of cases in each category.
5. Here, as in subsequent tables, totals of 99% of 101 % are due to rounding to the
nearest whole number for purposes of readability.
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As the following table shows, the typical accused was male
(95%), white (63%), young (71% under age 26), and had a prior crim
inal record (58%):
(A)

Demographic Portrait of Sample Population
Age
No.

15-17
18-20
21-25
26-29
30-39
40 and older
NA6

(B)

(C)

Sex
Male
Female

Race
White
Black
Other
NA

25
175
109
54
40

35
2

%

6
40
25
12
9
7

441

99%

418
23

95
5

441

100%

278
149
12
2

63
34
3

441

100%

125
34
25
120
101
36

41
8
39

441

99%

Prior Criminal Records
(0)

No Prior Convictions
Juvenile Record Only
Misdemeanor Record
Felony Conviction(s)
INAP7
NA

11

6. uNA" means not ascertained. In the subsequent analysis, all cases where the
particular variable under scrutiny was not ascertained have been excluded from that
question.
7. uINAP" means inapplicable. The 101 cases which are indicated as INAP are
those where no presentence report was filed (defendants were either acquitted or had
their case dismissed) and consequently, information concerning prior record was
unavailable.
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Of the 441 cases in the sample, only five were initially released
on their own recognizance ("ROR")8 and another 13 obtained ROR
following a motion to reduce. Thus, in 96% of all cases, money bail
was the only available method of pretrial release.
Bail was fixed in sums of $1000, $2,000, $5,000 or $10,000 in all
but 3% of the sampled cases:
Amount of Initial Bai"
Amount
ROR
$1,000

$2,000
$5,000
$10,000
Over $10,000

No.
5

%

98

22
38

168
106
56
8
441

1

24

13
2
100%

The Allen Circuit Court followed the master bond schedule 77% of
the time. Furthermore, codefendants in the study had bonds identi
cal to their fellow codefendants 98% of the time. This data suggests
that virtually no individual consideration is given to what amount of
bail, if any, is initially appropriate in any case.
Among those cases where pretrial status was ascertained (92% of
all cases), over one-fourth (28%) never obtained their pretrial free
dom, about one-fifth (22%) were never jailed and the remaining half
(50%) spent some time in jail pending the outcome of their cases. At
the time of disposition (e.g., dismissal, guilty plea), 41% of the sam
ple were incarcerated, and 59% were released.
As one might expect, there is an inverse relationship between
the amount of bail and the likelihood that the accused can post the
required security. In short, the higher the bail, the lower the percent
age who made it:

8. Ironically. in two of these cases the defendant was Jack Lee. the highest volume
bondsman in Ft. Wayne.
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Pretrial Status By Amount OfInitial Bail
No.
Percentage
Released

ROR
$1,000
$2,000
$5,000
$10,000

5
92

149
97
61

100
86
81
66
36

Most of the sampled cases were disposed of by either a guilty
plea (70%) or a dismissal of the charges (19%). Only II% of the cases
ever went to trial. About three-fourths of the accused (77%) were
convicted; about one-fourth (23%) were not. The study data plainly
shows a relationship between pretrial status and case outcome. As
shown below, defendants who were in jail continuously between ar
rest and final adjudication ("in") were more likely to be convicted
than those who were free on bail during all ("out") or part ("part")
of the proceeding:

Not Convicted
Convicted

Disposition By Pretrial Status
In
Part
13
25
87
75
100%
(113)

100%
(201)

Out

28
72

100%
(90)

Another way of looking at outcome is in terms of ultimate re
sult. Thus, for much of the subsequent analysis three possible out
comes are considered:
(1) The accused is not convicted, ie., acquitted or, more
commonly, obtains a dismissal of the charges;
(2) The accused is convicted but avoids a prison term, e.g. ,
suspended sentence, probation, fine; and
(3) The accused is convicted and sentenced to prison.

The table below shows not only that detained persons are con
victed more often than released persons (87% vs. 72%), but also that
they are given prison sentences seven times as often as those who are
never detained pretrial (70% vs. 10%):
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Outcome By Pretrial Status
In
Part
13
25
Not Convicted
17
34
Conv., No Prison
70
40
Conv., Prison
100%
(113)

99%
(201)
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Out
28

62
10

100%
(90)

Thus, those who are never detained pretrial have one chance in
ten of ultimately going to prison; in stark contrast, seven out of ten of
those jailed full time receive prison sentences.
Having demonstrated the stark discrepancy in case outcome be
tween those who are detained and those who are released, the next
inquiry must be whether there is any explanation for the discrepancy
other than detention. What follows is the elaboration analysis of the
relationship between pretrial status and outcome. 9 Several factors
are considered to determine whether they explain the apparent cor
relation between detention and less favorable outcome:
Type of Crime Charged
2. Prior Criminal Record
3. Type of Counsel
4. Race
5. Amount of Final Bail
l.

As the following analysis demonstrates, none of these factors,
either individually or in combination, explains the disparity in out
come between the detained and the released. This suggests deten
tion itself causes a less favorable case outcome.
1.

Type oj Crime

The discrepancy in case outcome between the detained and the
released might be thought attributable to a difference in the type of
crime charged between these two groups. Indeed, the circuit court's
use of a bond schedule makes it more probable that one charged
with a more serious crime will be detained. Further, it might be
thought that independent of the bail determination, the person
charged with a more serious crime will be more likely to be prose
cuted vigorously, adjudged guilty, and given a heavy sentence.
Not surprisingly then, the likelihood of an accused being de
tained before disposition varies widely according to the type of crime
9. See supra text accompanying note 45.
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charged. As the table below shows,1O persons accused of armed rob
bery and first degree burglary were more likely to be detained than
those accused of theft and second degree burglary.

In
Part
Out

Armed
Robbery
59
39
2
100%
(46)

Pretrial Status By Type of Crime
1st Degree
2nd Degree
Forgery
Burglary
Thift
Burglary
16
47
26
19
51
55
53
50
32
32
18
2
100%
(47)

100%
(38)

100%
(89)

100%
(97)

Other
25
49
25
100%
(87)

It is also generally true that those charges most likely to result in
detention are also the most likely to result in conviction and a prison
sentence.
Armed
Robbery
Not
Cony.
Cony.
No.
Prison
Cony.
Prison

Outcome By Type 0/ Charge
1st Degree
2nd Degree
Burglary
Forgery Thift
Burglary

Other

13

24

25

24

25

36

45

43

42

36

80

51

32

33

34

39

100%
(46)

100%
(47)

100%
(38)

100%
(89)

100%
(97)

100%
(87)

20

Because there is a positive correlation between the type of crime
charged and both the rate of detention and the likelihood of convic
tion and a prison term, it might be hypothesized that the reason for
the disparity in outcome between the detained and the released lies
in the type of charge. The table below, however, disproves this hy
pothesis because it shows that detained persons in any crime group
were more likely to be convicted and vastly more likely to be sen
tenced to prison than were the released people charged with the
same crime.
10. In this and subsequent tables, the 37 cases where pretrial status was not ascer
tainable have been deleted from analysis.
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In
Part

Not Convicted
Cony. No Prison
Cony. Prison
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Ollt

15

28

85

72

(1)

100%
(27)

100%
(18)

(1)11

9
27
64

17
46
38

(1)

100%
(22)

101%
(24)

(1)

10
40
50

33
38
29

(1)
(5)
(1)

100%
(10)

100%
(21)

(7)

14
29
57

28
32
40

25
68
7

100%
(14)

100%
(47)

100%
(28)

11
22
67

23
35
42

32
64
3

100%
(18)

100%
(48)

99%
(31)

1st Degree Burglary

Not Convicted
. Conv., No Prison
Cony. Prison

Forgery

Not Convicted
Conv., No Prison
Conv., Prison

Theft

Not Convicted
Conv., No Prison
Conv., Prison

2nd Degree Burglary

Not Convicted
Conv., No Prison
Conv., Prison.

II. In this and subsequent tables where there are less than ten cases, percentages
are omitted and raw figures are presented in parentheses.
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Other
Not Convicted
Conv., No Prison
Conv., Prison

18
4

77

26
42
33

32
54
14

99%
(22)

101%
(43)

100%
(22)

Consequently, the type of crime cannot explain the outcome dispar
.ity between the detained and the released groups, since the disparity
persists wit~ each crime category.
2.

Prior Criminal Record 12

Forty-one percent (41%) of those in the samplel3 had no prior
criminal record; 19% had never been convicted of a felony, but did
have a misdemeanor or juvenile record; and 39% had at least one
prior felony conviction. As one might expect, persons with a crimi
nal record were more likely to be detained than those without a
record:
Pretrial Status By Prior Criminal Record
Record
No Record
In

Part
Out

33
57
10

28
37
34

100%
(162)

99%
(116)

It was imposible to determine whether defendants with a prior
record were more likely to be convicted than those without a crimi
nal record because the data on prior record was derived from
presentence reports and thus it was available only for those con
victed. However, for those convicted it was possible to determine the
effect of prior record upon sentence, and not surprisingly, those with
a record were twice as likely to receive a prison term:
12. Prior criminal record here means having at least one of the following: a
juvenile record, a misdemeanor conviction, or a felony conviction.
13. The sample population for prior criminal record is 340 rather than 441. This
smaller number is a result of the fact that information concerning prior criminal record
was obtained from presentence reports, and the lOl cases in which the accused was not
convicted could not be considered si,nce a presentence report on such individuals was
never made.
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Sentence By Prior Criminal Record
Among those Convicted
Record
30
Conv., No Prison
70
Conv., Prison
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No Record
66

34
100%
(116)

100%
(162)

Nonetheless, when detained persons are compared with released
persons having comparable prior records (the factor of prior record
being held constant), the disparity in sentence outcome between the
detained and the released remains strong:
Sentence By Pretrial Status,
Control/ing For Prior Criminal Record
Record
No Record
In
Part
Out
In
Part
Out

Conv., No Prison
Conv., Prison

13

33

87
100%
(54)

92

73

70
30

100%

100%

(33)

(43)

100%
(40)

27

67

75
25

100%
(92)

100%
(16)

8

This table shows that among persons with a prior record, detained
persons are more that three times as likely to be sentenced to prison
as are released persons. Moreover, among those defendants with no
prior record, detainees are nine times as likely to receive a prison
term. Indeed, detained persons without a prior record were sen
tenced to prison almost three times as often (73% vs. 25%) as were
those persons with prior record who were released. 14
Because the detained received a much less favorable outcome
than those who are released even when prior record is. taken into
account, the factor of prior criminal record must be rejected as an
14. The gross disparity persists even when one controls for only those with a prior
felony record (at least one felony conviction):

Conv., No Prison
Conv., Prison

Sentence By Pretrial Status,
Controlling For Prior Felony Record
No Felony Record
Felony Record
Out
In
Part
Out
In
Part
20
16
24
(6)
62
92
(3)
80
38
76
8
84
100%
(37)

100%
(63)

(9)

100%
(SO)

100%
(72)

100%
(47)
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explanation for the different outcomes experienced by released and
detained persons.

3. Type of Counsel
The third characteristic to be considered is the type of counsel,
distinguishing between the defendant who employs his own attorney
and the defendant with a court-appointed public defender. As the
table below shows, there is a pronounced relationship between type
of counsel and pretrial status. Defendants represented by public de
fenders were far more likely to be detained than defendants repre
sented by privately retained lawyers.
Pretrial Status By Type
Public
Defender
In
Part
Out

01 Counsel

63
36
1

Retained
Counsel
6
58
35

100%

99%

(249)

(155)

Similarly, there is an apparent correlation between the type of out
come which an accused obtains and the type of counsel.
Outcome By Type 01 Counsel
Public
Defender
Not Convicted
Conv., No Prison
Conv., Prison

14
19
66
99%

(155)

Retained
Counsel
28
46
26

100%
(249)

Because there is a positive correlation between type of counsel
and both the rate of detention and the likelihood of conviction and a
prison term, it might be hypothesized that the reason for the dispar
ity between the detained and the released lies in the type of attorney.
Indeed, the statistics above support the commonly held assumption
that defendants are worse off if they are appointed a public defender
as opposed to retaining a private attorney. But the type of attorney
does not explain the case outcome disparity between the detained
and the released. Detained persons, regardless of the type of coun
sel, were still more likely to receive an unfavorable case outcome
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than were the released: IS

Not Convicted
Conv., No Prison
Conv., Prison

Outcome By Pretrial Status
Controlling For Type of Counsel
Public
Defender
Out
In
Part
In
31
21
10
6
19
21
62
57
(2)
71
100%
(97)

99%
(56)

(2)

99%
(16)

Retained
Counsel
ParI
27
39
34

Out
28
64
8

100%
(145)

100%
(88)

Among those represented by the public defender, jailed defend
ants were more likely to be convicted and imprisoned than those re
leased. Among those with privately-retained counsel, the detained
had a conviction rate approximately equal to the corresponding rate
among the released but they were much more likely to receive a
prison term if convicted (62% vs. 8%). Because the detained consist
ently fared worse, the type of defense counsel does not explain the
disparities in case outcome.

4. Race
It might be expected that one's race may affect both detention
and case outcome and the data indeed shows that a greater percent
age of non-whites were incarcerated pretrial than whites:

In

Part
Out

Pretrial Status By Race
White
Black
22
37
50
51
28
12
100%
(253)

100%
(138)

Hispanic
50
33
17
100%
(12)

Although race was not related to the rate of conviction, there
was a strong correlation between race and whether one received a
prison term - blacks were sent to prison far more often than were
whites.
15. These findings were confirmed in theNoe study. See infra Appendix B at 329.
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Outcome By Race
Black
Wltite
Not convicted
ConY., No Prison
Cony., Prison
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Hispanic

22
43
36

23
22
54

33
33
33

101%
(253)

99%
(138)

99%
(12)

Because of the relationship of race to both the likelihood of de
tention and the likelihood of unfavorable case outcome, it might be
that the outcome disparity between the detained and released was
attributable to race. However, when detained persons are compared
with released persons of the same race, the disparity in outcome
persists:
Outcome By Pretrial Status,
Controlling For Race
Wltite
In
Part
Not Convicted
Conv., No Prison
Cony., Prison

Out

16
20
64

19
42
39

30
63
7

100%
(56)

100%
(127)

100%
(70)

Black
Not Convicted
Conv., No Prison
Conv., Prison

10
12
78

34
21
44

18
59
24

100%
(51)

100%
(70)

100%
(17)

Hispanic
Not Convicted
Cony., No Prison
Cony., Prison

(3)

(1)
(2)
(3)

(1)

(6)

(4)

(2)
(2)

Because the detained within each race category recieved worse case
outcomes than did those who were released, race must be rejected as
an explanation for the different outcomes experienced by released
and detained persons.
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5. Amount ofBail
The amount of final bail is the last factor examined. The table
below demonstrates what common sense would dictate: pretrial sta
tus is related to the amount of bail; the higher the bail amount, the
lower the percentage of people who make it:

In
Part
Out

Pretrial Status By Amount Of Final Bail
ROR
$2,000 or Less
18
71
52
29
30
100%
(17)

100%

(253)

$2,000+
51
43
6
100%
(134)

The amount of bail is also related to case outcome:
Outcome By Amount Of Final Bail
ROR
$2,000 or Less
Not Convicted
47
22
Conv., No Prison
41
44
12
33
Conv., Prison
100%

(17)

100%

(253)

$2,000+
19
19

62
100%
(134)

Because of the strong relationship between the amount of final
bail and both the rate of detention and case outcome, it might be
argued that the amount of bail explains the disparity in outcome be
tween the detained and the released. If this theory were correct, one
would expect to find an increasing likelihood of the accused's being
detained, being convicted, and getting a prison term as the bail
amount increases. But, as the table below shows, the disparity in
outcome between the detained and the released persists even among
groups of people upon whom substantially the same bail was im
. posed. Regardless of the bail set, the released consistently received
far fewer prison sentences than did the detained.
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(A) ROR

Outcome By Pretrial Status,
Controlling For Amount OfFinal Bail
In
Part

Not Convicted
Conv., No Prison
Cony. Prison

42
42
17

319

Out
(3)

(2)

101%
(12)

(5)

27
62

24
38
37

26
65
9

100%
(45)

99%
(131)

100%

15
10
75

24
24
52

(2)
(4)
(2)

100%
(68)

100%
(58)

(8)

(0)

(B) $2,000 or Less

Not Convicted
Conv., No Prison
Conv., Prison

11

(77)

(C) $2,000+

Not Convicted
Conv., No Prison
Conv., Prison

The discrepancy in treatment between those detained and those re
leased persists even when the amount of bail is controlled for and
therefore the amount of bail does not explain the disparity in case
outcome.
6.

Combination

of Characteristics

So far, it has been shown that no other single factor accounts for
the disparate case outcomes experienced by detained and released
persons, even though several of the factors discussed above - in
cluding prior criminal record, type of counsel, and bail amount 
are by themselves related to pretrial status and outcome. The final
possibility is that these factors explain the disparity when considered
in combination, even though taken alone they do not.
This possibility is tested by holding constant several characteris
tics at the same time. A characteristic associated with higher fre
quencies of obtaining pretrial release and of receiving a favorable
case outcome is called favorable. Earlier tables indicated that lack
of a prior criminal record, a low bail amount, and a private attorney
are favorable characteristics in this sense. Thus, a defendant classi
fied as having three favorable characteristics is one who has no pre
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vious record, a final bail of $2,000 or less, and a private attorney. A
defendant with two favorable characteristics is one having two of the
three, etc.
Not suprisingly, there is a direct relationship between the
number of favorable characteristics and pretrial status:

In

Part
Out

Pretrial Status By Number
OfFavorable Characteristics
None
One
Two

Three

68
32

57
39
4

11
67
22

37
63

100%
(40)

100%
(102)

100%
(114)

100%
(57)

The table above shows that the number of favorable character
istics a defendant had was closely related to his ability to obtain his
pretrial release. Sixty-eight percent (68%) of the defendants who had
no favorable characteristics remained in jail all of the time. This
percentage steadily declines as the number of favorable characteris
tics were detained all of the time.
A similarly strong relationship was apparent for sentencing. 16
Among those convicted, nine of ten defendants with no favorable
characteristics ultimately received prison sentences, compared to
only one in ten of the defendants with three favorable characteristics:
Sentence By Number OfFavorable Characteristics
Two
Three
None
One
Conv., No Prison
10
21
60
88
Conv., Prison
40
12
79
90
100%
(40)

100%
(102)

100%
(114)

100% .
(57)

Because of the positive correlation between the number of
favorable characteristics and both pretrial status and the avoidance
of a prison sentence, it might be argued that the combination of
characteristics considered explains this disparity in outcome between
the detained and the released. However, the table below disproves
this hypothesis because it shows that detained persons were sen
16. It was not possible to relate the number of favorable characteristics to convic
. tion because data on prior criminal record was only available for those defendants who
were convicted.
.
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tenced far more frequently than released persons in the same
category:
Sentence By Pretrial Status,
Controlling For Number
OfFavorable Characteristics
None
In
Part

Conv., No Prison
Conv., Prison

15
85
100%
(27)

Out

100
100%
(13)

(0)

One

Conv., No Prison
Conv., Prison

14
86

28
72

(2)
(2)

100%
(58)

100%
(40)

(4)

Two

Conv., No Prison
Conv., Prison

54
46

57
43

76
24

100%
(13)

100%
(76)

100%
(25)

Three

Conv., No Prison
Conv., Prison
(0)

71
29

97
3

100%
(21)

100%
(36)

Consequently, even when highly relevant characteristics are consid
ered in combination, they do not provide an explanation of the out
come disparity between the detained and the released. The detained
consistently fare worse.
This study has shown that one factor - whether an accused is
released or detained pending trial - substantially influences both
the outcome of his case and the likelihood of his receiving a prison
sentence. By examining the type of crime charged, prior criminal
record, type of counsel, race, and the amount of bail, the study dem
onstrates that neither independently nor in combination do any of
these factors account for the disparity in case outcome between those
detained and those released. This suggests that the fact of detention
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itself has a direct and deleterious impact on the likelihood of convic
tion and the likelihood of receiving a prison sentence.
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APPENlJIX B
Noe v. County of Lake: Study of the Pauper Counsel
System in the Lake County Superior Court
This study of criminal defense attorneys in Lake County, Indi
ana was undertaken to test the frequently expressed observation that
defendants represented by pauper attorneys fare worse than defend
ants represented by private counsel and whether any disparity is due
to the system within which attorneys work. 1 It is generally difficult
to make such a determination because any disparity may be ex
plained by the caliber of the attorneys rather than the system itself.
However, because pauper counsel in Lake County are hired on a
part-time basis, their performance as pauper counsel can be com
pared directly with their performance in criminal cases when pri
vately retained.
The sample population selected for study consists of 1730 cases2
taken from the criminal causes which were filed in the Lake County
Superior Court, Criminal Division during 1975 and 1976 and in
which a final disposition was reached before July 31, 1977. 3 During
this 31 month period, the pauper staff was appointed in 43% of the
cases.4 A substantial period of time elapsed before indigent defend
ants obtained the services of counsel. The average length of time
from arrest to appointment was 12 days. In one-fourth of its cases
(25%), pauper counsel was not appointed until at least 14 days after
arrest, and in 8% of the cases over one full month elapsed before
appointment.
There were 19 attorneys who were employed as part-time pau
per attorneys during the period studied. Of these, 14 also handled
I. This study, like the Mudd study, was done under the direction of Dr. Eric W.
Single. See Appendix A infra at 306 n.1.
2. The term "case" is used to indicate a single criminal defendant. Thus, one crim
inal cause may consist of several defendants or "cases."
3. There were 2009 cases filed in 1975 and 1976 which were disposed of by July 31,
1977. Of these, 279 (13.9%) were excluded from the study for the following reasons:
(a) all cases (149) involving appeals from city courts; (b) all cases (19) in which the most
serious crime charged was a misdemeanor; (c) all cases in which the defendant was
charged with either extradition (16) or being a fugitive (62); and (d) miscellaneous (33),
e.g., change of venue from the county, inability to locate docket sheet. These cases were
excluded primarily because they would not accurately reflect the typical process of crimi
nal justice in the Lake County Superior Court. Pending cases were excluded at the re
quest of the clerk's office and because they were missing one of the important elements of
the study, ie., case outcome.
4. The type of representation at final disposition was proportionately identical to
the initial representation, pauper counsel handling 42% of the cases. The type of repre
sentation changed during the pendency of the proceeding in only 8% of the cases (134).
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criminal cases before the same court in a private capacity. These 14
attorneys handled 188 (20%) of the 920 cases handled by private
attorneys.
The sections below compare the results in cases where defend
ants were represented by pauper attorneys with cases where defend
ants were represented by private counseL s Although the primary
comparison is between pauper and private attorneys, the tables also
generally include a third category consisting of pauper attorneys act
ing in a private capacity ("P-Private"). This was done so that a di
rect comparison can be made between the results achieved by the
same attorneys, the only difference being that in some cases they are
employed by the judge rather than by their clients.
The first hurdle in any study such as this is to identify criteria by
which an attorney's performance can be measured objectively. This
inquiry is, of course, limited by the raw data which is available. The
information for this study was obtained from court docket sheets,
and it was determined that three areas would be examined:
(a) motions to reduce bail;
(b) motions for change of venue from the judges; and
(c) case outcome.

The reasons for selecting these criteria are readily apparent.
Case outcome, particularly the receipt of a prison term, is obviously
the most important consideration to any criminal defendant. More
over, as noted in the Mudd study, see supra Appendix A, because
case outcome may be adversely affected by one's pretrial detention,
motions to reduce bail are extremely important to defendants incar
cerated prior to trial. Finally, a motion for a change of venue from
the judge can also be important to a criminal defendant because
judges can also be important to a criminal defendant because judges
have highly divergent sentencing practices.
A. Pretrial Status & Motions to Reduce Bail

Slightly less than half of the sample population (45%) never ob
tained their pretrial freedom ("in"); the remaining 55% were able to
make bail at some point during the pendency of the proceedings
("out").6 As one might expect, defendants with pauper attorneys
5. Since the purpose of the study is to examine the performance of attorneys, the 89
cases in which the defendant was not represented by counsel at final disposition are ex
cluded from analysis.
6. Pretrial status could not be ascertained in 37 cases (2%). The study excludes
these 37 cases when pretrial status is considered.
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were far more likely to be detained pretrial than those represented
by private attorneys:

In

Out

Pretrial Status by Type
Pauper
70
30

of Attorney
Private

22
78

100%
(719)

100%
(891)

With a significantly higher percentage of clients in jail, one
would expect that pauper attorneys would file a greater number of
motions to reduce bail. The evidence, however, shows that just the
opposite occurs: pauper attorneys filed significantly fewer reduction
motions.
Private attorneys filed 383 motions to reduce bail while pauper
attorneys filed only 140. As a percentage of their caseload, pauper
counsel filed motions to reduce in 19% of their cases and private at
torneys filed such motions in 42% of their cases.
Pauper attorneys also filed reduction motions much later fol
lowing arrest. Whereas private attorneys filed their motions to re
duce on the average of 18 days following arrest, pauper attorneys did
not file their motions until an average of 38 days had passed. As a
result, indigents spend a longer time in jail before they even get a
chance to have their initial bail reduced.
Somewhat surprisingly, pauper attorneys were almost as suc
cessful as private attorneys in having their motions to reduce
granted. Whereas the court granted 88% of all reduction motions
filed by private attorneys, it granted 75% of the pauper attorney mo
tions. In view of this success, it is significant that pauper attorneys
filed reduction motions in only 19% of their cases.
B. Motions jor Change

of Venue from

the Judge

There are four full-time judges in the Lake Superior Court,
Criminal Division, and, at times, other visiting or part-time judges
sit as well. The sentencing practices among these judges differ
widely. A convicted defendant's chances of being sentenced to
prison are appreciably higher with Judges B and D than with the
other judges:'
7. One might suppose that the sentencing disparity among the judges is explained
by the fact that Judges B and D handle a higher percentage of cases in which judges
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Proportion lmprisioned Among Those Convicted-by
Judge at Final Disposition 8
Other
Judge A Judge B Judge C Judge D
No Prison
53
35
54
31
52.5
Prison
47
65
46
69
47.5
100%

(194)

100%

(199)

100%
(313)

100%
(259)

100%

(59)

Under Indiana law, at the time of the study, a criminal defend
ant had an opportuni~y for an automatic change of venue from the
judge originally assigned to his case. 9 In view of the divergent sen
tencing practice, this right to a change of judge was very important
to the accused.
One hundred ninety-nine motions for change of venue were
filed in the sampled cases. The overwhelming majority of the mo
tions (85%) were directed at the two judges who sentenced most
harshly, Judges B and D:

Judge
Judge
Judge
Judge

Other

A
B
C
D

Presiding Judge at Time of Venue Motion
No.
25

%

13

126

63

4
44

2
22

o

o

199

100%

As with motions to reduce bail, private attorneys filed venue
motions much more often than did pauper attorneys. Of the 199
motions, pauper attorneys filed only 17 of them (8%) whereas private
attorneys filed 182 (92%).10 As a percentage of their caseload, pau
traditionally give prison terms, e.g., violent crimes as opposed to misdemeanors. If this
theory were correct, one would expect to find a similar percentage of prison sentences
among judges when one controls for the crime involved. But except for murder (where
all convicted defendants were imprisoned), the disparity in sentencing practices among
the judges continued even when the crime convicted is isolated and controlled, i.e., re
gardless of the crime considered, Judges B and D sentenced defendants to prison more
often than the other judges. Thus, the type of crime does not explain the disparity in
sentencing practices.
8. It should be here noted that disparity of sentencing by individual judges is not
the focus of this study. The actual sentence received may be a product of many factors.
Rather we are here addressing the performance of pauper counsel.
9. See supra note 117 of article.
10. Twelve of the 19 pauper attorneys never filed any venue motions. Of the 7
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per attorneys filed venue motions in only 2% of their cases:
Percenlage of Cases in Which Venue
Molion Was Filed by Type ofAllorney
N ofmlns
N of cases

17
182

Pauper
Private

%

oflolal

737

2%

909

20%

In sharp contrast is the pauper attorneys' performance when
acting in a private capacity. Whereas they filed venue motions in
only 2% of their pauper cases, these same attorneys filed venue mo
tions in 26% of their private cases - a rate noticeably higher than
that of non-pauper, private attorneys:
Percenlage of Cases In Which Venue
Molion Was Filed By Type OfAllorney
No ofmlns
No ofcases

17

Pauper
Pauper-Private
Other Private

737
188
732

49
133

% oflolaI

2%
26%

18%

As the following table shows, defendants with pauper attorneys
were twice as likely as defendants with private counsel to have Judge
B at final disposition:
Final Judge by Final Allorney
Pauper P-Privale
Olher Privale
Judge B
Other Judges

TOlal

28
72

16
84

14
86

20
80

1000/0

100%
(188)

100%
(732)

100%
(1641)

(721)

At final dispostion, 61% of the cases before Judge B were pauper
cases. In contrast, only 40% of the cases before the other judges were
pauper cases.
The fact that pauper attorneys handled a disproportionate
number of cases before Judge B had a disparate effect on their indi
gent clients. This disparity can be explained only by pauper coun
sel's systematic failure to file venue motions in their pauper cases.
pauper attorneys who did file such motions, 12 of the 17 motions were filed by only two
of the attorneys.
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Case Outcome

A criminal case can be disposed of in one of four ways: guilty
plea, trial, dismissal, or diversion, e.g. , commitment to a state hospi
tal. Most of the cases in the sample were disposed of either by a
finding of guilty pursuant to a guilty plea (49%) or a dismissal of the
charges after a plea of not guilty (33%). Seventeen percent (17%) of
the cases went to trial and I % were diverted out of the criminal
process.
By type of attorney, the form of disposition was as follows:
Form
Guilty Plea
Trial
Dismissal
Diversion

Of Disposition by Type of Allomey
Pauper
54
20
26
1

P-Private
52
15
32

All Private
50
16
33
1

101%11
(721)

99%
(188)

100%
(920)

The table above shows that overall the disposition by type of
attorney was rather similar. Pauper attorneys were slightly more
likely than private counsel to try a case (20% vs. 16%), whereas pri
vate attorneys were more likely to have a case dismissed (33% vs.
26%). While there was little difference in the rate of guilty pleas
(54% vs. 50%), there was a significant disparity-between counsel as to
the conviction rate following trial:
Conviction Rate at Trial by Type ofAllomey
Pauper
P-Private
All Private
70
59
49
Convicted
Acquitted 12
30
41
51
100%
(142)

100%
(29)

1000/0
(151)

A defendant's chance of conviction following trial were greater than
two-to-one if represented by pauper counsel and an even one-to-one
if represented by a private attorney. Thus, althol.lgh the rate of going
to trial was not that different, the success rate following trial was.
II. Here, as in subsequent tables, totals of 99% or 10I % are due to rounding to the
nearest whole number for purposes of readability.
12. Acquittal here includes mistrials, hung juries, and not guilty by reason of
insanity.
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A more pragmatic way of looking at case outcome is in terms of
ultimate result. Three possible outcomes are considered:
(1) The accused is not convicted, ie., acquitted, or more
commonly, obtains a dismissal of the charges;
(2) The accused is convicted but avoids a prison term, e.g. , a
suspended sentence, probation, fine; and,
(3) The accused receives a prison term.

The table below shows not only that defendants represented by
pauper counsel are convicted more often than defendants repre
sented by private attorneys (67% vs. 58%), but also that they are
given prison sentences twice as often as those who retain their own
attorneys (49% vs. 23%).

Not Cony.
Conv., No Prison
Conv., Prison

Outcome by Type
Pauper
32

of Attorney

49

P-Private
39
39
22

99%
(721)

100%
(188)

18

All Private
42
35
23
100%

(920)

Thus, those who employ their own attorneys have one chance in four
of ultimately going to prison; in stark contrast, one of two defendants
represented by the pauper staff receive prison sentences.
Part of the disparity in case outcomes may be explained by pre
trial status, ie., whether a defendant was able to make bail. Among
those jailed pretrial, defendants with pauper attorneys were some
whatOmore likely to be sentenced to prison than those with private
attorneys (55% vs. 49%). Significantly, however, the disparity re
mains constant among those who are not detained pretrial - indi
gents with pauper attorneys are still twice as likely to receive a
prison term as are defendants represented by private counsel:
Outcome by Type of Attorney Among
Those Who Obtain Their Pretrial Release
Pauper
P-Private
All Private
Not Cony.
24
39
40
Conv., No Prison
47
44
40
Conv., Prison
36
14
16
100%
(200)

100%

(150)

100%

(707)
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This study shows that there was a significant disparity between
the performance of pauper attorneys and that of private counsel.
Pauper attorneys filed fewer motions to reduce bail even though
their clients were jailed prior to trial far more often. They also filed
a significantly lesser number of motions for change of venue ftom
the judge with the result that they handled a disproportionately high
number of cases before a judge who imprisons defendants more
often. Finally, defendants represented by pauper attorneys were
more likely to be convicted and upon conviction, were imprisoned
far more frequently than were defendants represented by private
counsel.
The study also showed that the difference between pauper and
private cases cannot be ascribed to any general lack of ability of pau
per attorneys. Pauper attorneys acting in a private capacity consist
ently did as well, if not better than, other private attorneys. The
difference must therefore be explained not by the abilities of the at
torneys but instead by some part of the system of indigent represen
tation which constrained pauper attorneys from pursuing their
clients' interests fully and effectively.
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